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Syndicated bank lending and rating downgrades:  
Do sovereign ceiling policies really matter? 
 
 
We examine the effect of firm credit rating downgrades on the pricing and structure of 
syndicated bank loans following rating downgrades in the firms’ countries of domicile. We 
find that the sovereign ceiling policies used by credit rating agencies create a disproportionally 
adverse impact on the bounded firms’ borrowing costs relative to other domestic firms 
following their sovereign’s rating downgrade. Moreover, the loans extended tend to be more 
concentrated and funded by fewer lead arrangers. Forming borrowing relationships with local- 
as well as foreign-banks and maintaining financial strength ameliorates bounded firms’ bank 
financing costs. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Credit ratings, Sovereign ceiling, Bank credit, Relationship lending, Foreign-
currency lending, Firm credit constraints. 
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1. Introduction 
Sovereign credit rating downgrades carry significant negative consequences for firms 
domiciled in publicly-downgraded countries. In rating the creditworthiness of debt obligors, 
major credit rating agencies (CRAs) maintain a so called ‘sovereign ceiling policy’ -whereby 
domestic firms are unlikely to receive a rating higher than that of their sovereign. Hence, when 
there is a sovereign downgrade, firms with ratings equal to that of their sovereign become 
technically ‘bounded’ by the implicit ceiling and they also get downgraded, irrespective of their 
fundamentals. Consequently, they bear the direct consequences of the downgrade whereas non-
bounded firms may only experience indirect consequences via the deterioration of the 
macroeconomic environment in the country. The literature shows that bounded corporate 
borrowers cut back on corporate investment and reduce their reliance on credit markets 
relatively more than firms with ratings below the bound following a sovereign downgrade 
event. Moreover, the bond yields of sovereign ceiling bounded firms increase significantly 
more than for otherwise similar firms (see Almeida, Cunha, Ferreira, and Restrepo, 2017). 
We investigate whether banks in the syndicated loan market would also alter their 
lending behavior in response to sovereign rating downgrades that impact borrowing firms. 
Specifically, would banks punish bounded firms more than non-bounded firms following the 
sovereign downgrade of the borrower’s country? To the best of our knowledge, this aspect of 
the impact of CRAs’ sovereign rating actions has not been addressed in the literature. Hence, 
this study fills the void in the extant literature by examining the responses of syndicated lenders 
following sovereign downgrades. It is important to understand how these major credit events 
impact on syndicated bank lending decisions given the significance of this type of bank credit 
extended to corporate borrowers.  
To explore the aforementioned we follow prior studies in employing an identification 
strategy that exploits the variation in corporate credit ratings that is due to CRAs’ sovereign 
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ceiling policies (see Adelino and Ferreira, 2016; Almeida, Cunha, Ferreira, and Restrepo, 
2017). As these studies argue, whilst there is no explicit requirement for CRAs to rate a non-
sovereign entity at or below the related sovereign, in practice, corporate credit ratings 
infrequently exceed those of their sovereigns. By applying this strategy to the syndicated 
lending market over 1993-2016, we show that the sovereign ceiling policy not only leads to an 
asymmetric effect on borrowers’ cost of credit, but also impacts how lenders work together to 
structure those loans. Firms with a rating equal to their sovereign before the downgrade are 
subject to significantly greater increases in loan spreads and other penalties relative to control 
firms rated below their sovereign (non-bounded firms). This extra cost is equal to 
approximately 55 basis points and represents almost USD 6.2 million of additional interest 
expenses for a loan of average size and maturity. Importantly, it mainly arises when bounded 
firms receive loans from foreign banks. In addition, they receive shorter loan maturities (by 10 
months) and tighter loan provisions. Thus, bounded firms face a significant disadvantage 
compared to their non-bounded counterparts in the event of a sovereign downgrade. 
Interestingly, these loans are granted from syndicates with relatively fewer members, 
where loan share is only divided between a limited number of lenders. These narrow and 
concentrated syndicates appear to be set up in response to the rising information asymmetry 
with regards to the borrower’s solvency risk following the sovereign downgrade. This 
corroborates with Sufi’s (2007) finding that widening information asymmetry is associated 
with more concentrated syndicates in loan facilities as lead banks are forced to take a larger 
share and provide more extensive monitoring. 
Similar to Adelino and Ferreira (2016) and Almeida, Cunha, Ferreira, and Restrepo 
(2017), our identification strategy has the advantage that non-bounded firms have similar but 
lower credit quality than bounded firms and the sovereign downgrade events represent 
exogenous shocks on corporate credit ratings. Hence, alternative explanations based on 
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changes in firm fundamentals, or firm credit risk, or both, are unlikely to explain the 
discontinuous change in ratings around the sovereign ceiling following the sovereign 
downgrade event. The exogenous and asymmetric effect of sovereign downgrades on firm 
ratings is thus likely to be due to the existence of the sovereign ceiling policy, and not 
necessarily to changes in either a firm’s fundamentals or the domestic macroeconomic 
environment. 
Several sensitivity tests show that these baseline findings are robust, and of these, the 
following four are noteworthy. First, we use different sets of fixed effects (see, e.g., Jiménez, 
Ongena, Peydró, and Saurina, 2014). These include “bank times year” and “lender’s country 
times year” fixed effects that exclude any alternative supply-side explanations of our findings, 
and further saturate our model to account for the time-varying macroeconomic environment in 
the lender’s country. Second, we also consider the impact of sovereigns’ local currency rating 
downgrades as a robustness check. Additionally, we examine the impact of rating outlooks as 
these are forward-looking assessments of sovereign credit quality. Third, we use alternative 
model specifications with different loan control variables to show that the results are not 
affected by the “bad controls problem.” We further employ specifications where our sample of 
bounded firms is matched with a subsample of unbounded firms according to their credit 
quality and their fundamental attributes. Fourth, we estimate a Heckman-type model, which 
models the probability of a firm borrowing from the given bank to account for sample-selection 
issues (Dass and Massa, 2011).  
We conduct additional analyses to understand the mechanism that leads to this high 
cost of international bank credit for bounded firms. By focusing on potential demand-side 
explanations, we show that this cost is contingent on certain firm characteristics and financing 
choices. In particular, large borrowers with less reliance on debt financing and greater reliance 
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on internal funds can partially offset the higher loan spread premium following the rating 
downgrade.  
Our examination of country fundamentals reveals that borrower countries with more 
developed financial markets are generally associated with lower bank borrowing costs. Hence, 
the concomitant increase in bank loan spreads following a sovereign downgrade can be 
ameliorated when sovereign bounded firms have access to alternative forms of financing. We 
reveal that the exchange rate arrangements also play a fundamental role since they allow for 
currency depreciation as a means for restoring competitiveness. In this regard, we find that the 
transition away from a fixed exchange rate system to more flexible arrangements, such as 
crawling pegs and bands, further eases the cost of international bank credit for bounded firms 
following a sovereign downgrade.  
Lastly, we explore how bounded firms should respond to sovereign downgrades to 
avoid or offset the higher borrowing costs and tougher loan conditions following a sovereign 
downgrade. We identify two potential avenues. First, establishing an information-intensive 
banking relationship with a lender is important. We find that by borrowing from the same lead 
lender at least once in the two years before the current loan, firms can recover a significant 
portion of the initial interest rate premium compared to firms with first-time bank-firm 
relationships. Furthermore, benefits to the bounded firms increase with the previous loan 
amount and frequency of such previous relationships. Second, borrowing from international 
lenders with subsidiaries in the borrower’s country mitigates the negative impact on bank loan 
terms. These subsidiaries enable the parent banks to gain access to important information about 
the firm’s solvency and prospects as well as the domestic macroeconomic environment. In both 
cases, the information asymmetry stemming from the sovereign downgrade and the subsequent 
downgrade of the bounded firms can be better assessed and managed, thereby resulting in more 
favourable loan terms. 
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This paper contributes to the literature on the impact of corporate credit rating 
downgrades on a firm’s cost of credit. In this regard, it highlights the higher cost of credit faced 
by bounded firms following a downgrade, especially when resorting to international financing; 
most importantly, it identifies the operative mechanisms that drive the higher borrowing costs. 
The closest papers to ours are possibly those of Adelino and Ferreira (2016), who in a similar 
setting examine the lending behavior of domestic bounded banks after the sovereign 
downgrade, whereas Almeida, Cunha, Ferreira, and Restrepo (2017) analyze the real impact 
on domestic bounded firms. We complement these studies, by investigating the impact of 
sovereign downgrades and the sovereign ceiling policy-induced corporate downgrades on the 
loan financing of the domestic bounded firm and evaluate the demand-side implications for the 
firm’s cost of credit. 
We present new and comprehensive evidence on the differential impact of sovereign 
downgrades (considering both foreign- and local-currency denominated ratings and as well as 
short-term rating outlooks) on bank borrowing costs, other non-price loan terms, and the 
syndicate characteristics of loans directed to bounded borrowers relative to non-bounded ones. 
Importantly, we identify potential avenues for affected firms to alleviate the negative impact 
stemming from the interaction of sovereign and corporate credit risk as reflected in the 
sovereign and corporate downgrade events, respectively. Concerning this interaction, we point 
to a new and overlooked aspect of the sovereign-firm nexus that affects firm financing 
conditions and materializes due to the operation of the sovereign ceiling rule. Thus far, prior 
studies have mainly investigated sovereign credit risk (through sovereign credit ratings) as 
determinants of corporate credit ratings (see Borensztein, Cowan, and Valenzuela, 2013), or 
corporate CDS spreads during the European sovereign debt crisis (see Bedendo and Colla, 
2015; Augustin, Boustanifar, Breckenfelder, and Schnitzler, 2018). Our work extends far 
beyond studies focused on the sovereign debt crisis, showing that sovereign downgrades 
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increased the bank borrowing costs of European firms (see Drago and Gallo, 2017) by 
contributing new evidence on corporate borrowers’ immunity to their country’s rating demise. 
Last but not least, we contribute to the literature on the importance of information 
asymmetry for syndicate formation. Information asymmetries between contracting parties are 
crucial for the design of optimal contracts (see Brealey, Leland, and Pyle, 1977; Holmstrom 
and Tirole, 1997). The asymmetries are manifested between the lending counterparties and 
primarily relate to the lead banks’ reputation. Lead banks subject to enforcement actions by 
their regulators increase their loan shares to entice participants to continue to co-finance the 
loan (see Delis, Iosifidi, Kokas, Xefteris, and Ongena, 2020). Furthermore, lead arrangers’ 
reputation measured by large-scale bankruptcies affect their subsequent syndication activity 
(see Gopalan, Nanda, and Yerramilli, 2011), while greater control-ownership divergence 
causes lead arrangers to retain higher loan shares (see Lin, Ma, Malatesta, and Xuan, 2012). 
However, asymmetries are also present between lenders and borrowers. In particular, 
lead arrangers retain the largest share of the loan the first time an opaque borrower accesses 
the syndicated loan market and retain lower amounts as the borrower subsequently accesses 
the market (see Sufi, 2007). This is the case for firms that require intense monitoring and due 
diligence, and suggests that problems of information asymmetry are reduced when the 
borrower becomes more ‘known’ in the syndicated loan market. However, the larger the 
retained share, the greater the increase in the moral hazard problems (see, e.g., Dennis and 
Mollyneaux, 2000; Dennis, Nandy, and Sharpe, 2000; Sufi, 2007; Ivashina, 2009).  
We provide evidence on the implications for syndicate structure when borrowing firms 
experience an exogenous negative shock to their creditworthiness that is totally unrelated to a 
deterioration in firm fundamentals. We document that the sovereign ceiling rule – due to an 
increase in firm-stemming information asymmetry – drives the lead arranger’s responsibility 
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for all price and non-price-setting decisions of the loan. This is in turn reflected in the formation 
of more concentrated syndicates with fewer lead arrangers acquiring a stake in the loan. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and empirical 
methodology. Section 3 presents and discusses the main empirical results. Section 4 examines 
the loan-demand channel and country fundamentals and further shows the importance of prior 
bank-firm lending relationships and the role of subsidiaries as a remedy for the increased firm 
borrowing costs. Section 5 concludes the paper. An Internet Appendix provides several 
additional summary statistics and robustness checks. 
 
2. Data and empirical model 
We obtain data from various sources to build our detailed matched bank-firm dataset. First, we 
collect all syndicated loan deals made (at the facility level) over the period 1993 to 2016 from 
the Refinitiv LPC DealScan database. Dealscan contains the most comprehensive historical 
loan-deal information available on the global syndicated loan market. We exclude all loans for 
which there is no conventional pricing (i.e., there is no loan spread data) and this removes all 
types of Islamic finance and very specialized credit lines. We match the loans with the long-
term foreign-currency sovereign credit ratings of the borrower’s country issued by Standard & 
Poor’s (S&P). The literature reports that S&P’s ratings are updated more frequently and 
generally precede other credit rating agencies (see Ismailescu and Kazemi, 2010; Alsakka, ap 
Gwilym, and Vu, 2014; Drago and Gallo, 2017).3 We match loan facilities with bank- and firm-
specific characteristics from Compustat, as well as with macroeconomic and institutional 
(country-year) variables from several sources. The number of loan facilities for our baseline 
specifications ranges from 61,985 to 82,715, depending on the controls and the set of fixed 
                                                 
3
 Credit ratings from S&P, along with ratings from Moody’s, are further allowed to be used for determining risk 
weights under Basel II. 
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effects used. These loans were granted by 573 lead lenders headquartered in 42 countries to 
4,278 borrowers from 54 countries; see Table 1 for key descriptive statistics. 
To examine whether a bounded firm faces a higher cost of credit following a domestic 
sovereign downgrade relative to non-bounded firms, we use a regression approach very similar 
to Adelino and Ferreira (2016), Almeida, Cunha, Ferreira, and Restrepo (2017), Berg, 
Saunders, Steffen, and Streitz (2016), and Gande and Saunders (2012).4 
 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝑎2𝐵𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑘𝑡−1 +                        𝑎3𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑘𝑡−1 × 𝐵𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝑎4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑘𝑡 + 𝑢𝑙𝑡    (1)
  
where 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑡 measures the cost of loan facility l originated at time t. The most 
widely used measure is the all-in-drawn spread (AISD), denoting the spread over LIBOR, 
although the recent literature (e.g., Berg, Saunders, Steffen, and Streitz, 2016) also highlights 
the importance of fees and all-in-spread undrawn (AISU). The vector 𝑎0 denotes different types 
of fixed effects described later in this section. Controls is a vector of control variables of 
dimension k, and u is a stochastic disturbance term. 
Sovereign downgrade is an indicator variable equal to one for a downgrade in the long-
term foreign-currency credit rating of the borrower’s country, and zero otherwise. Bound is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the firm has a credit rating equal to or above the credit rating 
of its domicile country, and otherwise zero. The interaction of the two, i.e., Sovereign 
downgrade × Bound, is in turn equal to one if in the year of the sovereign downgrade the firm 
                                                 
 
4
 Gande and Saunders (2012) examine a model where the loan amount (or leverage) of firms is regressed on the 
interaction term between traded syndicated loans (vs. non-traded loans) and the pre-post trade periods. Berg, 
Saunders, Steffen, and Streitz (2016), use a similar interaction terms model to examine the differential responses 
of loan spreads and other variables in Europe vs. the U.S. due to foreign lending and other institutional 
characteristics. Adelino and Ferreira (2016) adopt a diff-in-diff framework to examine the impact of domestic 
sovereign downgrades on the domestic bounded banks’ lending supply relative to non-bounded banks. Similarly, 
Almeida, Cunha, Ferreira, and Restrepo (2017) examine the real effects of domestic sovereign downgrades on 
domestic bounded firms compared to non-bounded firms. 
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has a credit rating equal to or above the credit rating of its domicile country, and zero otherwise 
(Table A2 provides information on sovereign credit rating downgrades and the domestic 
bounded firms at the time of the sovereign downgrade). The vector 𝑎0 denotes different types 
of fixed effects, Controls is a vector of control variables of different dimension k, and u is a 
stochastic disturbance. We identify the lender’s and the borrower’s country as the country in 
which the lender and the borrower are located, respectively. Where a loan is provided by the 
parent bank’s foreign affiliate or subsidiary, the lender’s country is set as the country of the 
affiliate/subsidiary. Similarly, for firms receiving loans through their foreign subsidiaries, we 
set the borrower’s country as the country of the affiliate/subsidiary.5 
Put simply, our identification strategy provides a direct comparison across two states: 
bounded (treated) firms and non-bounded (control) firms during the occurrence of a domestic 
sovereign downgrade. The main coefficient of interest is 𝑎3, which shows the differential effect 
of Sovereign downgrade on the cost of credit between bounded and non-bounded firms. In 
other words, we obtain identification from the fact that a sovereign downgrade exerts an 
asymmetric effect on the cost of loans granted to domestic bounded firms relative to control 
firms that are not at the bound. We expect 𝑎3 to be positive if the sovereign ceiling policies 
matter for the determination of loan spreads and thus increase the cost of credit for bounded 
firms. 
Moreover, the coefficient 𝑎1 shows how a sovereign downgrade affects the cost of 
credit for all loans in the sample. If the model is well identified, the interaction term and the 
control variables should explain (most of) the effect of Sovereign downgrade on the cost of 
                                                 
5
 For example, although Citibank (the parent bank) is headquartered in the US, for loans provided by Citibank 
International Plc, we set the lender’s country as the UK. In sensitivity tests, we further examine cases of cross-
border loans where the lending bank has an affiliate or subsidiary in the borrower’s country. If the bank can fund 
the loan through its affiliate/subsidiary by resorting to the domestic wholesale markets, it can – to an extent – 
remove the macroeconomic risk. To accomplish this we identify all banks’ subsidiaries in the borrower’s country. 
Similarly, we examine cases where the borrowing firm has an affiliate or subsidiary in the lender’s country, 
although the number of these subsidiaries is relatively small. We discuss this further in Section 4. 
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credit (i.e., 𝑎1 should be statistically insignificant). The effect of sovereign downgrades on the 
cost of loans for the domestic non-bounded firms should be minimal or zero, especially when 
controlling for other firm- and macro-level factors. 
We include a battery of other control variables and fixed effects to account for potential 
omitted variables. Following the relevant literature (e.g., Ivashina, 2009; Adelino and Ferreira, 
2016; Almeida, Cunha, Ferreira, and Restrepo, 2017; Hasan, Hoi, Wu, and Zhang, 2017; Kim, 
2019; Delis, Hasan, and Ongena, 2020), we control for loan characteristics such as the log of 
the loan amount, loan maturity (in months), the number of lenders in the syndicate, dummies 
for performance-pricing provisions and/or collateral, and the total number of covenants.6 We 
also control for the total assets of the bank (Bank size), the bank return on assets (Bank ROA), 
and the bank’s non-performing loans (Bank NPLs). Similarly, our firm-level controls include 
firm size (Firm size), firm return on assets (Firm ROA), and firm leverage (Firm Leverage). 
We include country-pair-specific variables, such as the difference in the GDP growth rates 
between the lender’s and the borrower’s countries (GDP growth), or in their GDP per capita 
(GDP per capita) to account for the differences in the degrees of economic development and 
the macroeconomic conditions of the borrower country. Detailed descriptions of these variables 
are provided in Table A1 and summary statistics in Table 1.  
We also use loan type fixed effects; these are important as loan facilities include credit 
lines and term loans, which have fundamental differences in their contractual arrangements and 
pricing (Berg, Saunders, and Steffen, 2016). In additional regressions we also include loan 
purpose fixed effects (e.g., corporate purposes, working capital, takeovers or acquisitions, debt 
repayment, etc.). Moreover, we use year, bank, and firm fixed effects. These fixed effects 
complement our bank- and firm-level characteristics and allow us to control for possible bank- 
and firm-specific explanations of our findings (such as changes in banks’ financial soundness, 
                                                 
6
 Distinguishing between types of covenants (e.g., general and financial covenants) does not affect our results. 
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corporate governance, or in firm’s credit risk and performance), that are not isolated by the 
inclusion of our set of control variables. We further control for changes in the macroeconomic 
environment of the lenders’ countries and the borrowers’ countries using lender’s country fixed 
effects and borrower’s country fixed effects, respectively. These fixed effects saturate the effect 
of Sovereign downgrade × Bound from other country (socioeconomic and political) effects on 
bank lending;7 moreover, they control for changes in monetary conditions. Further, we use 
country-pair fixed effects to capture common characteristics between the lenders’ and 
borrowers’ country-pairs. 
In even more stringent specifications, we use bank × year fixed effects. These allow us 
to control for time-varying supply (bank)-side explanations of our findings (such as changes in 
a bank’s financial soundness, corporate governance, etc.). The regression still yields results on 
the main coefficients of interest because there are multiple loan facilities from the same bank 
within years. Similarly, the use of lender’s country × year fixed effects shields our specification 
from country-year (macroeconomic) developments in the lenders’ countries. Again, the 
regression still yields significant results on the main coefficient of interest because there are 
multiple loan facilities from the same lender country within each year. Additionally, we build 
our baseline specification with bank-level fixed effects and report the results including bank × 
year and lender’s country × year fixed effects in robustness tests.  
The number of loan facilities in our baseline specification is 61,985. Table 1 reports the 
key descriptive statistics for the set of loan-, bank-, firm-, and macro-level variables in our 
sample. In Panels A and B of Table 2 we report the summary statistics for key loan features for 
those bounded firms not experiencing a domestic sovereign downgrade in a given year vs. 
bounded firms experiencing a domestic sovereign downgrade; Panel C reports their 
                                                 
7
 These are country factors affecting all banks and firms within a country. Several studies examine such macro 
effects on international bank lending (e.g., Delis, Hasan, and Ongena, 2020; and the associated references), and 
in this study these effects are fully controlled for via the fixed effects.  
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differences. As shown in Table A3 the total number of loans granted to bounded firms is 3,210 
and constitute approximately 5.2% of the full sample. Out of these, 392 loans are granted to 
bounded firms experiencing a domestic sovereign downgrade. We find that, on average, AISD 
is 105 basis points higher for bounded firms when experiencing a sovereign downgrade 
compared to bounded firms without a sovereign downgrade. This difference is statistically 
significant at the 1% level, and is also evident when the AISU is considered. In addition, loans 
granted to the former type of firms are more likely to be secured with collateral and have more 
provisions. In contrast, these loans are granted from syndicates with fewer members and also 
carry fewer covenants.  
 [Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
 
3. The effect of sovereign ceiling policies on the cost of credit 
 
3.1. Baseline results 
Table 3 reports our baseline results. We cluster standard errors by firm and also by year to 
avoid time-varying correlations in the data driving our inferences. In line with our discussion 
in Section 2, we consider different fixed effects in our model specifications. In column (1), we 
include the simplest fixed effects, namely those at the loan-, year-, bank- and firm-level. In 
column (2), we introduce borrower’s country fixed effects, while in column (3), lender’s 
country fixed effects are used. These control for macroeconomic developments in the lenders’ 
and borrowers’ countries, respectively. We further add loan purpose fixed effects and country-
pair fixed effects in column (4). In the last two specifications, we add bank × year fixed effects 
(columns 5-6), while the last column also includes lender’s country × year fixed effects.8 
                                                 
8
 The number of observations and the corresponding number of banks and firms in columns 5 and 6 are larger 
because we do not use bank characteristics, which are not available for many banks. Without those characteristics 
we would start off with more than 80,000 observations. 
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[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Across all specifications, the coefficient on Sovereign downgrade is statistically 
insignificant, which is not surprising as sovereign credit risk should not affect AISD unless the 
borrowing firm is affected (also in line with our priors discussed in Section 2). The coefficient 
on Bound is generally insignificant as the sovereign ceiling also should not affect financial 
intermediation until a sovereign downgrade event occurs.  
We use column (2) as our baseline specification, as the set of fixed effects included in 
the given specification captures the effect of sovereign ceiling policies on loan spreads and is 
consistent across all other model specifications. The main coefficient of interest 𝑎3 shows that 
a sovereign downgrade event increases AISD by an average of 54.6 basis points (bps) for 
bounded firms compared to non-bounded firms. This is a large and economically significant 
effect, equal to a 32.5% (=54.6 bps ÷ 168.5 bps) increase for the average loan in our sample. 
Given that the average loan size is $1.13 billion, bounded firms experiencing a sovereign 
downgrade pay, on average, approximately USD 6.17 million (=$1.13 billion × 54.6 basis 
points) more per year in interest payment. Considering that the average time to maturity is 4.2 
years, this represents approximately USD 25.83 million in extra interest expenses over the 
loan’s duration.9 Therefore, we can infer that the sovereign ceiling rule substantially raises the 
cost of loans for bounded firms compared to firms that are not at the bound in the event of a 
sovereign downgrade.  
In Table 4, we replicate the estimations from Table 3 by replacing Sovereign 
downgrade with its local-currency counterpart (Sovereign downgrade lc). Results across all 
specifications mirror those of Table 3 for all our variables of interest. Unsurprisingly, the 
results are similar considering the strong positive correlation between the two types of credit 
                                                 
9
 Assuming 4.2 annual payments and LIBOR as the discount rate, the increase in interest expense amounts to USD 
24.0 million for an average 12-month LIBOR rate of 3.0% during our sample period (for similar calculations, see 
Ivashina and Sun, 2011). 
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ratings, as foreign-currency credit rating downgrades are almost always accompanied by local-
currency credit rating downgrades. The slightly weaker coefficient on our interaction term, 
which now ranges from 35.9 to 49.1 basis points might be attributed to the fact that insurance 
on sovereign debt is mostly denominated in foreign currency, thereby inducing greater 
sensitivity to foreign-currency credit rating changes relative to local-currency credit rating 
changes. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
In Table A3 of the Appendix, we examine the sensitivity of our estimates to the “bad 
controls” problem, by interchangeably excluding loan-level control variables from our 
specifications.10 We initially omit all loan-level variables (column 1) and sequentially 
introduce quantitative information on the loan (Loan amount, Maturity, Collateral, Number of 
lenders, Performance provisions, General covenants) in columns 2-4.11 Irrespective of the 
model specification used, the coefficient on the interaction between sovereign downgrade 
remains consistently positive and statistically significant indicating that the cost of bank credit 
is higher for bounded versus non-bounded firms. 
The size and magnitude of the estimated coefficients on the control variables in Tables 
3-4 are generally in line with expectations and the recent works of Bae and Goyal (2009), 
Ivashina (2009), Cai, Saunders, and Steffen (2018), and Delis, Hasan, and Ongena (2020). In 
particular, loan spreads decrease with the loan amount, while maturity appears to be irrelevant. 
The imposition of collateral further increases AISD as these loans are generally deemed to be 
riskier. Also, loans are more competitively priced when more performance provisions are 
included or there are more banks participating in the syndicate. The behaviour of the bank-
                                                 
10
 Since the “bad controls” problem is due to differences in the composition of loans to a given firm, in an 
alternative sensitivity test we include weights based on the number and amount of loans received by each firm 
(results available upon request). 
11
 The replacement (or addition) of General covenants with Financial covenants or Net covenants leaves our 
results unchanged. 
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level variables is also largely as anticipated. In this regard, a higher return on bank assets is 
associated with decreasing AISD, while firm characteristics appear immaterial for loan spreads 
as their effect is mostly captured by the sovereign ceiling rule-induced corporate downgrade. 
Lastly, the higher the difference between the borrower and the lender countries’ GDP per 
capita, the lower the spread on loans directed to the borrower countries. 
There is a possibility of an even stronger impact of sovereign downgrades for the 
sovereign bounded borrowers if both borrower and lender country sovereigns are downgraded 
at the same (or in a similar time frame) and the lenders are also sovereign bounded. 
Unfortunately however, additional complications in modelling and a lack of usable 
observations for simultaneous sovereign downgrades prevent a quantification of these effects. 
 
3.2. Short-term ratings and rating outlook 
We further distinguish between short- and long-term credit ratings, since it might be 
that some of the effects of sovereign downgrades on the bounded firm’s borrowing costs is 
stemming from downgrades in the sovereign’s short-term credit ratings that usually precede 
(or coincide with) downgrades in the sovereign’s long-term credit ratings. To test this, in 
specification (1) in Table 5, we interact Sovereign downgrade × Bound with its short-term 
counterpart Short-term downgrade.12 The coefficient on the double interaction term – albeit 
relatively weaker than our baseline estimates – is positive and significant, verifying that long-
term sovereign downgrades affect bounded firms disproportionally more relative to those 
below the bound. However, this asymmetric effect of Sovereign downgrade on bounded firms 
is not magnified when its short-term counterpart is also considered, as the latter appears to exert 
a negligible effect as seen by the insignificant coefficient on the triple interaction term). 
                                                 
12
 We further include all double interactions. For expositional purposes these are not reported here and are 
available on request. 
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[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Credit ratings are inherently backward-looking credit risk measures whereas outlooks 
attached to current ratings are forward-looking assessments made by the credit rating agencies. 
As such, outlook measures contain additional information that might be priced into loan 
spreads. We consider changes in the outlook for long term foreign currency sovereign ratings.  
In specification (2), we include an interaction of Sovereign downgrade × Bound with Outlook 
downgrade. The coefficient on the triple interaction term is positive and statistically significant 
and larger in magnitude compared to the double interaction term. This suggests that a 
deterioration in the sovereign’s credit rating outlook is considered as an indicator of impending 
credit rating downgrades. Its effect on AISD is over and above the effect exerted by Sovereign 
downgrade × Bound, as reflected in its positive and statistically significant coefficient. 
 
3.3. Domestic borrowing vs foreign borrowing 
This section examines potential differences in the effect of sovereign downgrades on the 
bounded firms’ cost of credit between domestic and foreign loans. Cross-border loans 
constitute a significant component of the syndicated loan market and emerge as an increasingly 
popular form of corporate financing. 13 Moreover, although domestic lenders and borrowers are 
equally affected by the sovereign event, foreign banks are not. In this regard, we examine 
whether bounded firms are faced with higher borrowing costs when they resort to foreign banks 
for financing relative to when they resort to domestic banks. In the first two columns of Table 
6, we run our baseline specification for the subsample of loans granted from foreign banks 
(column 1) and the subsample of loans granted from domestic banks (column 2).  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
                                                 
13
 Cross-border syndicated lending reported in DealScan amounted to more than $2 trillion in 2016. 
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Initially, we examine the combined effect of sovereign downgrades and the sovereign 
ceiling rule on cross-border borrowing operations. In total, we observe 26,286 loan facilities 
granted from foreign banks, which represent approximately 42.4% of our sample. In these 
operations, foreign banks are exposed to the deteriorating macroeconomic fundamentals in the 
bounded firm’s country. They are further exposed to exchange rate risk, either directly through 
lending in the borrower country’s currency, or indirectly through lending in their own domestic 
currency. In the presence of these risks, we expect that foreign banks pass the costs to firms in 
the form of higher loan spreads. Our estimates in column (1) confirm this proposition: the 
coefficient on our double interaction term is statistically significant and equal to 50.3 basis 
points. This further reveals that most of the effect of sovereign downgrades on bounded firms’ 
borrowing costs materializes when the latter obtain financing from foreign rather than domestic 
banks. 
Next, we consider loans granted from domestic lenders to domestic borrowers. This is 
the largest category in our sample, constituting 35,699 loans or approximately 57.6% of our 
total loan facilities. Since in cases of domestic loans banks are also affected by the sovereign 
downgrade event, we expect that they are also subject to price concessions when lending 
domestically; therefore, the higher spread with which bounded firms are faced following the 
sovereign downgrade, should not be evident when borrowing from domestic banks.14 Estimates 
from specification (2) verify this conjecture, since bounded firms are not faced with an increase 
in their loan spreads after the downgrade event (non-statistically significant coefficient on 
Sovereign downgrade × Bound).  
However, banks can also be subject to the sovereign ceiling rule, which can in turn 
reduce their lending supply and drive their loan spreads up (see Adelino and Ferreira, 2016). 
                                                 
14
 In Section 4, we further examine the pricing of loans granted by domestic bounded banks following a sovereign 
downgrade.  
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To this end, column (3), replicates specification (2) by replacing our bounded firm indicator 
with an indicator on whether the lending bank is bounded or not (Bound (Bank)). Estimates 
reveal that indeed, bounded banks charge a higher loan spread equal to more than 26 basis 
points, when lending domestically following a domestic downgrade; a finding in line with 
Adelino and Ferreira (2016). In our last specification (column 4), we further consider the case 
where both loan counterparties are bounded. This is a rare event, as we observe only 9 loans 
granted from bounded lenders to domestic bounded borrowers. Nonetheless, our estimates 
indicate that these loans carry a higher spread (surpassing 30 basis points) relative to loans 
where none of the counterparties is bounded (coefficient on Sovereign downgrade × Bound 
(Bank & Firm)). 
 
3.4. Results from a subsample of firms with similar fundamentals 
To alleviate remaining concerns that our results are not driven by the sovereign ceiling rule, 
we further employ a subsample of firms with similar fundamentals that are either above the 
bound or marginally below. To accomplish this, our sample of bounded firms is matched with 
a subsample of unbounded firms according to their credit rating and their fundamentals. Results 
from this exercise are reported in Table 7. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
We initially consider bounded firms vis à vis firms that are one notch below the bound 
(column 1). According to the results, the effect of sovereign downgrades on bounded firms is 
even more pronounced than our initial estimates; a sovereign downgrade event increases AISD 
by 73.8 basis points for bounded firms compared to firms just below the bound (coefficient on 
double interaction). This in turn represents an increase of more than 35% compared to our 
baseline results. In each of the subsequent specifications, we retain the preceding 
specification’s subsample and progressively impose an additional matching criteria. 
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Specifically, we further limit our subsample to include firms of a similar size, return on assets, 
and level of leverage (columns 2-4 respectively). Across these specifications the coefficient on 
Sovereign downgrade × Bound retains its negative and statistically significant sign, while its 
size surges to appoximatelly 106.4 basis points as we progressively use tighter matching 
criteria to select control firms (specifications 3-4). Again, this effect is almost double that of 
the baseline estimate, thus validating the higher cost of credit faced by bounded firms relative 
to other very similar firms that are just below the bound (and unaffected by the sovereign 
ceiling effect). 
 
3.5. Results for AISU 
An important extension of our analysis relates to the role of loan fees. According to Berg, 
Saunders, and Steffen (2016), commitment plus facility fees, defined as all-in-spread-undrawn 
(AISU), are larger for high-volatility firms. Thus, we might expect that riskier firms face higher 
overall borrowing costs through higher fees. A constraining factor of the global DealScan 
database is that the reporting of fees is limited, either because loan deals do not include 
specifications for undrawn funds or simply due to missing information. Nevertheless, in Table 
8 we replicate Table 3 using AISU as the dependent variable. Across all specifications, the 
coefficient on Sovereign downgrade × Bound is positive and statistically significant at 
conventional significance levels, raising AISU by approximately 28.4% (specification (3)., i.e. 
7.62 compared to the sample mean of 26.84 basis points as shown in Table1); therefore, the 
sovereign ceiling rule is further priced in the fees.15 Table A8 confirms the response of AISU 
to Sovereign downgrade × Bound when local-currency credit ratings are also considered. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
                                                 
15
 We further estimate specifications 1-6 without the inclusion of AISD as a control variable; results confirm the 
positive and statistically significant coefficient on our interaction term (available upon request). 
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3.6. Effect of the sovereign ceiling rule on non-price loan structure  
Our analysis further relates to the effect of the sovereign ceiling rule on other loan terms. To 
this end, each of the specifications reported in Table 9 estimates our baseline regression by 
using each of the following loan terms as a dependent variable: Loan amount, Maturity, 
Collateral, Number of lenders, Performance provisions, and Herfindahl Index. Starting from 
column (1), we notice that sovereign bounded firms are not necessarily credit rationed by 
lending syndicates in response to rating downgrades compared to non-bounded firms as the 
loan amount given is not significantly different relative to those of control firms. However, we 
observe that Sovereign downgrade × Bound is negatively related to loan maturity (column 2). 
Bounded firms receive loans that are on average 10.5 months less than those received by the 
other firms. Hence, although banks appear willing to accommodate both the bounded and non-
bounded firms’ need for financing after the downgrade event, they significantly shorten the 
loans made to bounded firms. 
 In specification (3), we observe that the sovereign ceiling rule does not exert any 
influence over a lending syndicate’s decision with regards to the imposition of collateral 
following the downgrade event (column 3). However, they tend to increase the requirement of 
performance pricing provisions (column 4). The last two specifications examine the effect of 
Sovereign downgrade × Bound on syndicate structure. Overall, a sovereign downgrade for a 
borrower’s country results in a narrower and more concentrated syndicate for loans directed to 
the bounded firms relative to the non-bounded counterparts in the downgraded country. The 
likely corporate downgrade of bounded firms in the event of a sovereign downgrade due to the 
sovereign ceiling rule acts as a disincentive for lending banks to enter the syndicate (column 
5). Also, each of the syndicate members assumes a higher portion of the loan to ease the 
resulting information asymmetry with regards to the borrowing firm’s solvency risk; in turn 
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this is also reflected in an increase in the syndicate’s Herfindahl index (column 6). These results 
are in line with the previous findings of Sufi (2007) in the presence of information asymmetry. 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
3.7. Additional sensitivity tests 
In Table A4, we confirm the insensitivity of our inferences to the type of standard error 
clustering used. In this respect, we initially cluster standard errors by loan and year, and loan 
and firm (columns 1 and 2 respectively). Given, the multi-country nature of our dataset, we 
consequently cluster errors by borrower’s country and year (column 3), and by borrower’s 
country and firm (column 4). Our last specification adopts a more demanding clustering, as 
standard errors are clustered by borrower’s country and firm and year. Across all 
specifications, estimates remain almost identical to our baseline results. 
Thus far, we assume that all loans enter the model with equal weights. Normally, the 
fixed effects in Table 3 provide a safeguard against cross-country variations. We nevertheless 
acknowledge that the empirical specification might leave the analysis open to the critique that 
countries receiving more or fewer loans might affect our results disproportionately. To this 
end, we re-estimate our preferred specification using weighted least squares and several 
different weights based on the country-year number of loans. We retain the same set of fixed 
effects and report results from this exercise in Table A5. We initially weight by the number of 
loans extended by a given lender’s country to a given borrower’s country scaled by the total 
number of loans in our sample during the full sample period (column 1); in column (2), we 
calculate this measure at the annual frequency.  
 Consequently, we weight by the total number of loans directed from a given lender to 
a given borrower’s country scaled by the total number of loans received by the country of the 
borrower during our full sample period (column 3) and a given year (column 4). Our last 
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weighting scheme concerns the total number of loans between a given lender-borrower pair to 
the total number of loans between that pair (columns 5 and 6 respectively). Across all 
specifications, and irrespective of the type or frequency of the chosen weight, the coefficient 
on Sovereign downgrade × Bound retains its positive and statistically significant value. As for 
the coefficients on the set of our loan- and bank-level control variables, these are in line with 
those suggested by our baseline regressions. 
Thus far our results could be subject to a sample-selection bias, in the sense that the 
variables driving our findings might further determine the firm’s decision to receive a loan 
from the particular bank. It may be, for instance, that the impact of the sovereign ceiling rule 
on loan contracting is due to affected (bounded) firms being the ones more likely to request a 
loan. To eliminate this potential selection bias from our estimates, we follow Dass and Massa 
(2011) and employ Heckman’s (1979) two-stage model to calculate the probability of a firm 
entering into a loan deal. In the first stage, we run a probit model to estimate the firm’s loan-
taking decision. During this stage, our loan sample is extended and includes all syndicated loan 
facilities available in Dealscan. We calculate Heckman’s lambda (inverse mills ratio) and 
include it as an additional control variable in the second-stage OLS estimation of specifications 
(1)-(3) of Table A6. 
 In line with Dass and Massa (2011), we assume that the borrower’s decision to get a 
syndicated loan is a function of the main determinants of the decision to borrow in general. 
Consequently, our probit regression is augmented with a set of loan-, bank-, and firm-level 
characteristics; a set of weights for the number, origin, and direction of loans made in a given 
year; loan type, year, bank, firm, and borrower’s country dummies. Our set of annual weights 
include the number of loans made by a given bank (Bank loans), the number of loans to a given 
firm (Firm loans), and the number of loans between a given bank-firm pair (Bank-firm loans). 
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We present results from this exercise in columns 1-3 of Table A6 (Panels A and B). 
Probit estimates (columns 1-3 of Panel A), indicate that the higher the firm’s size, return on 
assets, and leverage, and the lower the firm’s reliance on equity financing, the more likely is 
the completion of a syndicated loan deal. Loans of a greater amount and shorter maturity are 
more likely to be granted, particularly when these loans include many lenders, are secured, and 
carry pricing provisions and covenants. Most importantly, estimates from the second-stage 
regressions (columns 1-3 of Panel B) confirm the asymmetrically strong positive impact of the 
sovereign ceiling rule on AISD (as reflected in the coefficient on Sovereign downgrade × 
Bound).  
Last, we control for differences stemming from the macroeconomic and institutional 
environment in the borrower’s country as these factors are known to also influence lending 
decisions (see, e.g., Delis, Hasan, and Ongena, 2020). Specifically, we include certain 
macroeconomic and institutional controls (debt-to-GDP ratio, inflation dynamics, prevalence 
of democratic institutions, rule of law, economic freedom, real interest rate) and a measure of 
global uncertainty (global stock market volatility). In theory, the slow-moving nature of these 
variables should cause them to correlate strongly with the borrower’s country and country-pair 
fixed effects employed in model specifications 4-6 in Table 3. Due to their high pair-wise 
correlations, we do not employ all variables simultaneously. Results from this exercise remain 
very similar to our baseline results (Table A8). 
 
4. Identifying the mechanisms and potential remedies 
Thus far, our analysis points to an asymmetrically higher cost of credit faced by bounded firms 
relative to non-bounded firms following a sovereign downgrade event in their country. In this 
section, we identify those firm characteristics that potentially offset this disproportionately 
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4.1 Exploring the mechanisms: The loan-demand channel 
We consider the alternative demand-side explanations for our results and identify certain firm 
traits that may be driving our results. To this end, Table 10 includes the interaction of Sovereign 
downgrade × Bound with a number of different firm characteristics reflecting the firm’s size, 
profitability, capital structure and operating performance. Specification (1) reveals that the 
effect of the sovereign ceiling rule on the cost of credit is contingent on firm size. In this regard, 
large firms are able to offset, to some extent, the higher spread following a sovereign 
downgrade. A one standard deviation increase in the firm’s total assets saves the firm 
approximately 22.5 basis points (=2.03 × 11.06 bps) or 12.4% of the initial spread charged (the 
coefficient on Sovereign downgrade × Bound × Firm size). Although this is not the case with 
the firm’s return on assets, as Firm ROA appears to exert no differential impact on loan spreads 
(coefficient on triple interaction in specification 2), bounded firms generating high operating 
income and net income are able to contain their high borrowing costs relative to their non-
bounded counterparts (coefficients on triple interactions in specifications 3-4).  
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
The next two specifications consider the firm’s decision with regards to its capital 
structure. Estimates point to a positive relationship between firm indebtedness and loan 
spreads, as more leveraged firms face higher borrowing costs; however, greater reliance on 
equity financing exerts the opposite effect, thereby easing the firm’s interest burden 
(coefficients on triple interactions in specifications 5 and 6, respectively). Similarly, firms with 
larger cash holdings and retained earnings further manage to partially reverse the increased 
borrowing costs after the downgrade event. This result is intuitive since the reliance on own 
funds limits the need to resort to external financing. In this respect, a one standard deviation 
increase in the firm’s cash holdings and retained earnings enables the firm to recover 22.2% 
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and 14.1% respectively of the initial spread increase (coefficients on triple interactions in 
specifications 7-8). 
 
4.2 Exploring the mechanisms: Fundamentals of the borrower country  
Consequently, we allow for the possibility that the firms’ decision to resort to bank financing 
is related to borrowing conditions and credit constraints in the domestic credit market as well 
as the level of domestic financial market development. We expect that firms in countries with 
less developed financial markets and consequently a greater reliance on the banking sector are 
subject to higher borrowing costs. This is, in turn, a natural corollary of the reduction in 
domestic credit supply following a downgrade (see Adelino and Ferreira, 2016). However, in 
countries with developed financial markets, domestic firms have access to alternative sources 
of financing that consequently ease their borrowing costs. To examine this hypothesis, we 
include the triple interaction term between measures a set of variables reflecting the financial 
market conditions and the fundamentals in the borrower’s country and Sovereign downgrade 
× Bound. 
We present results in Table 11, where we initially focus on the level of stock market 
capitalization in a borrower’s country. Estimates from specification (1) suggest that a highly 
capitalized domestic stock market acts as a counterweight to the increasing loan spreads 
following a sovereign downgrade (a significant and negative coefficient on triple interaction 
term). Consequently, and considering the literature that typically measures credit constraints 
using the ratio of credit provided by banks over GDP (e.g., Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 
2010; Manova, 2012), we focus on the measures reflecting the type and volume of domestic 
credit provided for the domestic economy. In particular, we generate a binary variable equal to 
one if countries fall within the 75th percentile of domestic credit provided by either the non-
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bank financial sector (specification 2) or the banking sector (specification 3), and zero 
otherwise. 
Estimates in specifications (2)-(3) verify our earlier expectations about the offsetting 
effect of the level of domestic financial flexibility on the corporate borrower’s cost of credit. 
The coefficient on Sovereign downgrade × Bound × Financial sector credit suggests that 
bounded firms can alleviate their interest rate burden if operating in an economy where credit 
is principally provided by the non-bank financial sector. On the other hand, affected firms in 
countries with a greater reliance on the domestic banking sector are faced with significantly 
higher borrowing costs following the downgrade event (a positive and significant coefficient 
on Sovereign downgrade × Bound × Banking sector credit). Moreover, when the ratio of these 
variables is considered (specification (4)), we notice that countries with a greater reliance on 
credit from the financial sector relative to the banking sector experiences lower borrowing costs 
for their affected firms (the coefficient on the triple interaction). 
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
Our last exercise concerns the importance of the exchange rate regimes for the 
borrowing firm’s cost of credit. One key lesson from the 1990s currency crises was the 
increasing difficulties faced by countries when attempting to build a reputation needed to 
sustain a durable fixed exchange rate (Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz, 1995; Obstfeld and 
Rogoff, 1995). Consequently, many of them adopted a more flexible form of exchange-rate 
targeting as a way to limit currency volatility, while reducing susceptibility to speculative 
attacks. This trend was nevertheless reversed following the Asian financial crisis and the 
Russian default, with countries favouring corner solutions and adopting either hard pegs (e.g., 
currency boards, dollarization, or currency unions) or freely floating exchange rate regimes 
(Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). It is therefore not clear how exchange rate arrangements affect the 
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cost of credit, especially in the aftermath of financial crises which usually precede or follow 
downgrades in the sovereign’s credit rating. 
We explore this in specification (5), by interacting Sovereign downgrade × Bound with 
Exchange rate arrangement, i.e., the borrower’s home exchange rate regime by considering 
the exchange rate classification of lzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2017). The measure is a 
categorical variable ranging from 1 to 5, with lower values reflecting less flexible regimes such 
as currency board arrangements or de facto pegs and higher values reflecting more flexible 
regimes such as managed or freely floating arrangements.16 Presumably, wide bands allow 
authorities to actively use monetary policy when it is most needed, thereby enhancing the 
overall credibility of their commitment to the band and stabilizing intra-band movements and 
exchange rate fluctuations (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995). In addition, flexible arrangements 
allow for currency depreciation as a means of restoring the competitiveness of the downgraded 
country, thereby facilitating the recovery of the domestic economy. Indeed, the negative and 
statistically significant coefficient on Sovereign downgrade × Bound × Exchange rate 
arrangement in specification (5) indicates that moving away from a fixed regime and allowing 
for some degree of fluctuation lowers the cost of bank credit for affected firms after the 
downgrade event. The additional interest rate savings amount to approximately 27 basis points 
or 25.9% of the original interest rate premium charged. 
 
4.3. Relationship lending 
Our results thus far highlight an important competitive disadvantage of bounded firms relative 
to non-bounded borrowers in the event of a sovereign downgrade that persists in a number of 
sensitivity tests. In this section, we consider two potential practices that might help alleviate 
                                                 
16
 The classification further includes a sixth category for dual markets in which parallel market data is missing. 
However, the respective classification does not apply to any of the countries in our sample. 
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the negative effects from a sovereign downgrade - the formation of bank-firm lending 
relationships and the utilization of bank and firm subsidiaries.  
Prior lending relationships allow lenders to acquire valuable information about the 
borrowing firm’s operations and credit risk. It is reasonable to expect that bounded firms with 
prior lending ties with their banks might be able to offset the higher loan spreads following a 
sovereign downgrade. We test this hypothesis in Table 12, by interacting our variables of main 
interest with Relationship lending, a variable reflecting the existence of a prior lending 
relationship between the given bank-firm pair over the previous 5-year period (see e.g., 
Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan, 2009).  
[Insert Table 12 about here] 
 Estimates in column 1 suggest that relationship borrowers are able to recover 
approximately 27.6 basis points (or 41.2%) of the interest rate premium following a downgrade 
event (the coefficient on Sovereign downgrade × Bound × Relationship lending). The offsetting 
effect of relationship lending further increases with the size and magnitude of this relationship: 
the greater the number or the amount of loans between the given bank-firm pair during the 
previous 5-year period, the greater the interest rate savings for the bounded firms following the 
sovereign downgrade (coefficients on triple interaction terms in columns 2-3). 
The next two specifications of Table 12 examine the role of subsidiaries. When the 
lending bank operates an affiliate or subsidiary in the borrower’s country, it can gain access to 
important information about the firm’s creditworthiness and operations. Furthermore, through 
its subsidiary, the bank is accustomed to the domestic macroeconomic environment, while it 
can also remove part of the macroeconomic risk if it can fund the loan through its 
affiliate/subsidiary by resorting to the domestic wholesale markets. We, therefore, expect that 
borrowers resorting to lenders with subsidiaries in the borrower’s country, minimize the 
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information asymmetry with regards to the firm’s credit risk as well as the domestic 
macroeconomic risk enabling them to achieve more favourable loan terms. 
This is verified by the estimates in column (4), where loans granted from banks with 
domestic subsidiaries carry an approximately 64% lower spread than the average loans directed 
to bound firms following the sovereign downgrade (the coefficient on triple and double 
interaction terms, respectively). Similar reasoning applies to firms operating subsidiaries in the 
lead bank’s country. By operating in the lender’s country, the firms can communicate important 
information regarding its operations to the lender so as to reduce information asymmetry. 
However, as estimates in column (5) reveal, this did not help as the coefficient on the triple 
interaction term is not significant. Therefore, it appears that the resulting minimization of the 
information asymmetry is mainly of a supply-side nature and materializes via the bank 
subsidiaries’ lending activities in the borrower countries. 
Our last specification evaluates an additional mechanism through which bound firms 
ease their borrowing costs after a sovereign  downgrade - government ownership. In fact, 
although government ownership is generally associated with a higher cost of debt, consistent 
with state-induced investment distortions, it is associated with a lower cost of debt during 
financial crises and for firms more likely to be in financial distress, when implicit government 
guarantees (subsidies) become widely anticipated (see Ağca and Celasun, 2012; Anginer and 
Warburton, 2014; Borisova, Fotak, Holland, and Megginson, 2015). As the default of a 
domestic and especially a foreign investment target is less likely to carry the “political stigma” 
associated with failures of domestic state-owned firms, we should expect that these government 
backed firms will get access to lower borrowing costs during turbulent times. Indeed, estimates 
from column (6) suggest that bound firms under government ownership are able to offset the 
initial increase in loan spreads following the sovereign downgrade (coefficients on the double 
and triple interaction terms, respectively). 
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5. Conclusion 
This paper examines the impact of changes in credit ratings on bank loan contracting by taking 
advantage of the heterogeneous variations in corporate credit ratings induced by the sovereign 
ceiling policies of credit rating agencies. Our results suggest that firms with ratings at the 
sovereign bound are subject to significantly higher borrowing costs and worse loan conditions 
following a sovereign downgrade than otherwise similar firms whose ratings are not at the 
sovereign bound. Our baseline specification suggests that loans directed to these firms are 
priced at approximately 55 basis points higher than the corresponding spread on loans to non-
bounded firms. These results are robust to several changes in the baseline specification and 
alternative estimation methods. We calculate this additional cost of the sovereign ceiling rule 
for the average loan size and maturity to be approximately USD 6.2 million. Thus, firms 
bounded by their sovereign’s credit rating have a significant disadvantage compared to their 
non-bounded counterparts in the event of a sovereign downgrade. Moreover, we show that this 
additional cost materializes when bounded firms obtain financing from foreign banks. 
We further find that bounded firms are also in a disadvantageous position when non-
price loan terms are considered. Although there is no evidence of credit rationing on behalf of 
banks, the affected firms generally receive loans of shorter duration (by 10 months) that are 
more likely to carry performance provisions. The sovereign downgrade-induced information 
asymmetry has further implications for lending syndicate structure with loans to bound firms 
being systematically granted by smaller and more concentrated syndicates. 
Our analysis further investigates the mechanisms leading to this excessive increase in 
loan spreads by considering alternative demand-side explanations. We show that this increase 
is contingent on certain firm characteristics since larger and less-leveraged borrowers with a 
greater reliance on own funds can partially offset the initial loan spread premium following the 
downgrade event. When turning to country fundamentals we find that borrower countries with 
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more developed financial markets (and where credit is mostly provided by the non-bank 
financial sector rather than the banking sector) are generally associated with lower borrowing 
costs. The adoption of a more flexible exchange rate regime further eases the cost of credit for 
bound firms following a sovereign downgrade, as it allows for greater monetary freedom. 
Firms have also some levers at their disposal in order to reduce the post-downgrade 
widening in information asymmetry. These include borrowing from banks with whom they 
have prior lending relationships or borrowing from banks that operate subsidiaries in the 
borrower’s country; either of these can lower the extra cost of credit that bound borrowers are 
subject to after a sovereign rating downgrade. Future research in this area may further explore 
the interactive effects of the banking regulatory environment within borrower countries with 
the rating events.
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
The table reports summary statistics (number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values) for 
all variables used in the estimations of the main text. All variables are defined in Table A1.  
 
Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
AISD 61,985 168.45 131.61 -200.00 1,505.00 
AISU 29,901 26.84 23.38 0.75 450.00 
Sovereign downgrade 61,985 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Sovereign downgrade lc 61,793 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Short-term downgrade 61,963 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00 
Outlook downgrade 61,985 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
Bound 61,985 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 
Loan amount 61,985 20.01 1.35 12.47 24.62 
Maturity 61,985 50.22 25.82 1.00 1,140.00 
Collateral 61,985 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Number of lenders 61,985 14.49 11.23 1.00 290.00 
Performance provisions 61,985 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00 
General covenants 61,985 0.81 1.21 0.00 7.00 
Financial covenants 61,985 0.75 1.13 0.00 7.00 
Net covenants 61,985 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
Bank share 19,644 0.13 0.13 0.00 1.00 
Herfindahl 19,644 1,015.81 1,364.75 0.00 10,000.00 
Bank size 61,985 13.82 1.01 7.59 19.37 
Bank ROA 61,985 0.27 0.57 -5.83 5.70 
Bank NPLs 61,985 0.95 2.04 -1.26 25.41 
Firm size 61,985 9.56 2.03 3.17 24.13 
Firm ROA 61,985 0.09 0.67 -5.54 31.08 
Firm EBITDA 59,027 7.28 1.94 -1.55 21.13 
Firm income 47,976 6.18 2.04 -5.52 16.91 
Firm leverage 61,985 3.09 67.84 -7,270.33 3,569.37 
Firm equity 58,355 8.29 2.04 -2.58 21.85 
Firm cash 58,292 6.12 2.53 -6.91 17.02 
Firm retained earnings 44,363 7.92 2.21 -4.07 20.75 
GDP growth 61,985 0.32 1.86 -22.73 28.44 
GDP per capita 61,985 -1,688.35 13,597.44 -88,250.53 104,376.70 
Stock market capitalization 59,442 1.32 1.35 0.05 12.54 
Financial sector credit 60,842 1.91 0.54 -0.04 3.46 
Banking sector credit 60,842 0.70 0.37 0.08 2.33 
Exchange rate arrangement 61,806 3.33 1.13 1.00 5.00 
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Table 2. Summary statistics for bounded firms vs. bounded firms pre- and post- sovereign downgrade 
The table reports summary statistics for key price and non-price loan terms. All variables are defined in Table A1. Panel A 
includes observations for the group of bounded firms (i.e., firms with a credit rating equal to or above their sovereign prior to 
the sovereign downgrade). Panel B includes observations for the group of firms at the sovereign bound when the sovereign is 
downgraded. Panel C reports results from the mean-comparison test for differences in the mean and standard error between 
observations in Panel A and Panel B. The*** mark denotes statistical significance at 1% level. 
 
Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
      
Panel A: Bounded firms pre-sovereign downgrade 
 
AISD 3,210 91.54 80.42 1.00 1325.00 
AISU 647 13.73 13.96 0.75 101.25 
Loan amount 3,210 19.99 1.16 15.42 23.85 
Maturity 3,210 40.46 31.68 3.00 234.00 
Collateral 3,210 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 
Number of lenders 3,210 20.90 13.14 1.00 86.00 
Performance provisions 3,210 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 
General covenants 3,210 0.13 0.54 0.00 4.00 
      
Panel B: Bounded firms post-sovereign downgrade 
 
AISD 392 196.27 138.97 20.00 650.00 
AISU 115 49.56 44.63 5.00 180.00 
Loan amount 392 20.71 1.47 16.12 23.81 
Maturity 392 41.49 21.63 3.00 146.00 
Collateral 392 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Number of lenders 392 14.42 7.30 1.00 46.00 
Performance provisions 392 0.25 0.44 0.00 1.00 
General covenants 392 0.02 0.12 0.00 1.00 
 
Panel C: Mean-comparison test for the mean and standard error 
 
  Mean Std. error   
AISD  104.73*** 7.16   
AISU  35.83*** 4.20   
Loan amount  0.73*** 0.08   
Maturity  1.03 1.23   
Collateral  0.05** 0.02   
Number of lenders  -6.48*** 0.44   
Performance provisions  0.20*** 0.02   
General covenants   -0.12*** 0.01     
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Table 3. Baseline results with different fixed effects 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics [in brackets]. Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table A1. 
Estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by firm and year. Each specification includes a different set of fixed 
effects, as given in the lower part of the table. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sovereign downgrade -2.426 -2.426 -2.426 -2.354 4.745 7.432 
 [-0.310] [-0.310] [-0.310] [-0.285] [0.609] [0.981] 
Bound 10.032 10.032 10.032 10.890 10.778* 13.534** 
 [1.618] [1.617] [1.617] [1.667] [1.720] [2.144] 
Sovereign downgrade × Bound 54.627*** 54.627*** 54.627*** 52.207*** 45.053*** 46.087*** 
 [2.970] [2.969] [2.969] [2.888] [3.346] [3.236] 
Loan amount -6.935*** -6.935*** -6.935*** -7.344*** -7.111*** -7.188*** 
 [-6.018] [-6.015] [-6.015] [-6.815] [-6.368] [-6.378] 
Maturity 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.109 0.161* 0.160* 
 [0.794] [0.794] [0.794] [1.226] [1.813] [1.789] 
Collateral 32.060*** 32.060*** 32.060*** 30.550*** 27.843*** 27.737*** 
 [5.737] [5.735] [5.735] [5.595] [4.897] [4.865] 
Number of lenders -0.440*** -0.440*** -0.440*** -0.475*** -0.446*** -0.461*** 
 [-3.496] [-3.495] [-3.495] [-3.704] [-3.483] [-3.539] 
Performance provisions -14.914*** -14.914*** -14.914*** -15.792*** -16.112*** -16.193*** 
 [-4.583] [-4.581] [-4.581] [-5.134] [-5.442] [-5.441] 
General covenants 4.434*** 4.434*** 4.434*** 4.072*** 3.557** 3.595*** 
 [3.214] [3.213] [3.213] [2.893] [2.797] [2.845] 
Bank size 0.193 0.193 0.193 -0.389   
 [0.076] [0.076] [0.076] [-0.184]   
Bank ROA -5.712* -5.712* -5.712* -4.948*   
 [-1.958] [-1.957] [-1.957] [-1.729]   
Bank NPLs 0.489 0.489 0.489 0.448   
 [1.514] [1.513] [1.513] [1.420]   
Firm size -1.045 -1.045 -1.045 -3.454 -2.472 -2.473 
 [-0.401] [-0.401] [-0.401] [-1.407] [-1.215] [-1.219] 
Firm ROA -3.336 -3.336 -3.336 -2.961 -3.093 -3.201 
 [-0.951] [-0.950] [-0.950] [-0.955] [-1.165] [-1.201] 
Firm leverage 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.009 0.010 0.010 
 [1.037] [1.037] [1.037] [0.754] [0.774] [0.751] 
GDP growth -0.612 -0.612 -0.612 -0.577 -1.037  
 [-0.767] [-0.767] [-0.767] [-0.904] [-1.164]  
GDP per capita  -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002** -0.003  
 [-1.831] [-1.830] [-1.830] [-2.302] [-1.705]  
Constant 305.260*** 305.260*** 305.260*** 343.612*** 319.736*** 328.166*** 
 [7.496] [7.493] [7.493] [9.245] [14.213] [14.353] 
Observations 61,985 61,985 61,985 61,874 82,444 82,715 
Adj. R-squared 0.768 0.767 0.767 0.775 0.786 0.784 
Loan type effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose effects N N N Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y N N N 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y N N 
Bank × year effects N N N N Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Lender’s country effects N N Y Y Y N 
Lender’s country × year effects N N N N N Y 
Borrower’s country effects N Y Y Y Y Y 
Country-pair effects N N N Y Y Y 
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Table 4. Baseline results with different fixed effects (local-currency ratings) 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics [in brackets]. Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table A1. 
Estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by firm and year. Each specification includes a different set of fixed 
effects, as given in the lower part of the table. In all specifications Sovereign downgrade lc is a binary variable equal to one if the 
sovereign’s local-currency credit rating is downgraded in the year before the loan facility’s origination year, otherwise zero. The 
*, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sovereign downgrade 
-3.316 -3.316 -3.316 -3.940 1.758 4.920 
 [-0.490] [-0.489] [-0.489] [-0.547] [0.253] [0.732] 
Bound 9.590 9.590 9.590 10.339 11.042 14.654** 
 [1.376] [1.376] [1.376] [1.452] [1.603] [2.178] 
Sovereign downgrade lc × Bound 49.111** 49.111** 49.111** 47.538** 35.918** 36.698** 
 [2.715] [2.714] [2.714] [2.689] [2.662] [2.533] 
Loan amount -6.843*** -6.843*** -6.843*** -7.260*** -7.047*** -7.130*** 
 [-5.944] [-5.942] [-5.942] [-6.732] [-6.274] [-6.288] 
Maturity 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.104 0.155* 0.153 
 [0.723] [0.723] [0.723] [1.161] [1.744] [1.714] 
Collateral 32.224*** 32.224*** 32.224*** 30.702*** 27.818*** 27.673*** 
 [5.735] [5.733] [5.733] [5.598] [4.855] [4.810] 
Number of lenders 
-0.437*** -0.437*** -0.437*** -0.471*** -0.444*** -0.463*** 
 [-3.413] [-3.411] [-3.411] [-3.619] [-3.394] [-3.478] 
Performance provisions -14.876*** -14.876*** -14.876*** -15.765*** -16.108*** -16.189*** 
 [-4.546] [-4.544] [-4.544] [-5.096] [-5.416] [-5.403] 
General covenants 4.413*** 4.413*** 4.413*** 4.044*** 3.584** 3.623*** 
 [3.185] [3.183] [3.183] [2.859] [2.792] [2.838] 
Bank size 0.163 0.163 0.163 -0.392   
 [0.065] [0.065] [0.065] [-0.187]   
Bank ROA 
-5.726* -5.726* -5.726* -4.991*   
 [-1.964] [-1.964] [-1.964] [-1.736]   
Bank NPLs 0.524 0.524 0.524 0.480   
 [1.602] [1.601] [1.601] [1.501]   
Firm size 
-1.530 -1.530 -1.530 -3.927 -2.996 -2.923 
 [-0.570] [-0.569] [-0.569] [-1.550] [-1.320] [-1.287] 
Firm ROA -3.310 -3.310 -3.310 -2.925 -3.078 -3.200 
 [-0.947] [-0.947] [-0.947] [-0.949] [-1.157] [-1.196] 
Firm leverage 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.009 0.010 0.010 
 [1.036] [1.036] [1.036] [0.750] [0.768] [0.743] 
GDP growth -0.662 -0.662 -0.662 -0.624 -1.113  
 [-0.813] [-0.812] [-0.812] [-0.965] [-1.250]  
GDP per capita  
-0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002** -0.003*  
 [-1.912] [-1.911] [-1.911] [-2.409] [-1.938]  
Constant 308.954*** 308.954*** 308.954*** 346.994*** 323.614*** 332.335*** 
 [7.457] [7.454] [7.454] [9.201] [13.856] [14.057] 
Observations 61,773 61,773 61,773 61,663 81,859 82,127 
Adj. R-squared 0.768 0.768 0.768 0.775 0.786 0.784 
Loan type effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose effects N N N Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y N N N 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y N N 
Bank × year effects N N N N Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Lender’s country effects N N Y Y Y N 
Lender’s country × year effects N N N N N Y 
Borrower’s country effects N Y Y Y Y Y 
Country-pair effects N N N Y Y Y 
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Table 5. Interaction with short-term ratings and outlook 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics [in brackets]. Dependent variable is AISD and all 
variables are defined in Table A1. Estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by firm 
and year. The lower part of the table denotes the type of fixed effects used in each specification. In 
specification (1), Sovereign downgrade × Bound is interacted with Short-term downgrade, i.e., a 
binary variable equal to one, if the sovereign’s short-term credit rating is downgraded in the year 
before the loan facility’s origination year (otherwise zero). In specification (2), Sovereign downgrade 
× Bound is interacted with Outlook downgrade, i.e., a binary variable equal to one, if the sovereign’s 
credit rating outlook is downgraded in the year before the loan facility’s origination year (otherwise 
zero). The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
(1) (2) 
Sovereign downgrade -2.648 -2.202 
 [-0.331] [-0.283] 
Bound 10.334 9.299 
 [1.622] [1.520] 
Sovereign downgrade × Bound 27.252** 29.465** 
 [2.084] [2.553] 
Sovereign downgrade × Bound × Short-term downgrade 35.521  
 [1.194]  
Sovereign downgrade × Bound × Outlook downgrade  47.828** 
  [2.140] 
Short-term downgrade 56.341  
 [1.391]  
Outlook downgrade  8.524 
  [1.559] 
Loan amount -6.912*** -6.917*** 
 [-6.024] [-6.016] 
Maturity 0.074 0.074 
 [0.806] [0.813] 
Collateral 32.139*** 32.206*** 
 [5.708] [5.753] 
Number of lenders -0.441*** -0.441*** 
 [-3.489] [-3.506] 
Performance provisions -14.842*** -14.886*** 
 [-4.555] [-4.569] 
General covenants 4.429*** 4.415*** 
 [3.194] [3.200] 
Bank size 0.190 0.205 
 [0.076] [0.081] 
Bank ROA -5.592* -5.634* 
 [-1.902] [-1.926] 
Bank NPLs 0.496 0.497 
 [1.470] [1.550] 
Firm size -1.085 -0.897 
 [-0.419] [-0.335] 
Firm ROA -3.343 -3.338 
 [-0.950] [-0.951] 
Firm leverage 0.013 0.013 
 [1.036] [1.036] 
GDP growth -0.558 -0.637 
 [-0.700] [-0.813] 
GDP per capita  -0.002* -0.002* 
 [-2.061] [-1.990] 
Constant 305.038*** 303.255*** 
 [7.523] [7.362] 
Observations 61,963 61,985 
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Adj. R-squared 0.768 0.768 
Loan type effects Y Y 
Year effects Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y 
Borrower’s country effects Y Y 
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Table 6. Domestic borrowing vs foreign borrowing 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics [in brackets]. Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table A1. 
Estimation method used is OLS with standard errors clustered by firm and year. The lower part of the table denotes the type of 
fixed effects used in each specification. In specification (1), estimates are from the subsample of loans from foreign banks. In 
specifications (2)-(4), estimates are from the subsample of loans from domestic banks. In specification (3), Sovereign downgrade 
is interacted with Bound (Bank), i.e., a binary variable equal to one if the lender’s credit rating is equal to or above the lender’s 
country credit rating in the year before the loan facility’s origination year, otherwise zero. In specification (4), Sovereign 
downgrade is interacted with Bound (Bank & Firm), i.e., a binary variable equal to one if the lender’s and the borrower’s credit 
ratings are equal to or above their country’s credit rating in the year before the loan facility’s origination year, otherwise zero. 
The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) 
Loans from 
foreign banks 
(2) 
Loans from 
domestic banks 
(3) 
Loans from 
domestic banks 
(4) 
Loans from 
domestic banks 
Sovereign downgrade 6.223 -10.952 -16.961* -4.983 
 [0.967] [-0.911] [-2.044] [-0.437] 
Bound 9.964 19.423*   
 [1.670] [1.777]   
Bound (Bank)   -2.508  
   [-0.157]  
Bound (Bank & Firm)    -29.031 
    [-1.738] 
Sovereign downgrade × Bound 50.335** 36.724   
 [2.667] [1.466]   
Sovereign downgrade × Bound (Bank)   26.298**  
   [2.916]  
Sovereign downgrade × Bound (Bank & Firm)    30.525* 
    [2.038] 
Loan amount -4.578** -6.975*** -5.770*** -5.910*** 
 [-2.650] [-6.807] [-3.535] [-4.773] 
Maturity 0.192* -0.081 0.144** 0.124** 
 [1.974] [-0.730] [2.239] [2.438] 
Collateral 17.234*** 37.034*** 41.976*** 42.638*** 
 [2.820] [6.791] [11.796] [11.833] 
Number of lenders -0.401** -0.483*** -0.702*** -0.610*** 
 [-2.197] [-3.450] [-3.762] [-4.005] 
Performance provisions -4.840 -18.336*** -28.992*** -28.107*** 
 [-1.360] [-5.063] [-6.310] [-7.971] 
General covenants 4.213 4.846*** 3.686*** 3.440*** 
 [1.581] [3.488] [2.899] [2.825] 
Bank size -0.944 0.342 -6.346 -3.076 
 [-0.255] [0.111] [-1.697] [-1.190] 
Bank ROA -3.104 -8.139 -8.444** -6.589* 
 [-1.065] [-1.710] [-2.187] [-1.749] 
Bank NPLs 0.098 0.104 0.578 0.912 
 [0.338] [0.170] [0.558] [1.263] 
Firm size 1.180 -11.779*** -8.656*** -7.551*** 
 [1.397] [-3.175] [-3.548] [-3.490] 
Firm ROA -0.569 -44.584 -152.633*** -74.037* 
 [-0.605] [-1.416] [-3.303] [-2.003] 
Firm leverage 0.011 0.013 0.003 0.005 
 [1.224] [0.571] [0.813] [1.122] 
GDP growth -0.668    
 [-0.989]    
GDP per capita  -0.001*    
 [-1.761]    
Constant 238.152*** 416.918*** 459.141*** 399.281*** 
 [4.316] [7.767] [7.678] [7.887] 
Observations 26,286 35,699 35,699 35,699 
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Adj. R-squared 0.810 0.750 0.676 0.684 
Loan type effects Y Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y Y 
Borrower’s country effects Y Y Y Y 
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Table 7. Results from subsamples with similar firm fundamentals 
This table reports coefficients and t-statistics [in brackets]. Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in 
Table A1. Estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by firm and year. Different specifications include 
different subsamples of matched firms. Specification (1) includes a subsample of bounded firms and firms that are one 
notch below the bound. Specification (2) includes the subsample of specification (1) and further limits the subsample to 
firms with size (Firm size) within one standard deviation of the sample mean. Specification (3) includes the subsample 
of specification (2) and further limits the subsample to firms with return on assets (Firm ROA) within one standard 
deviation of the sample mean. Specification (4) includes the subsample of specification (3) and further limits the 
subsample to firms with leverage (Firm leverage) within one standard deviation of the sample mean.  The lower part of 
the table denotes the type of fixed effects used in each specification. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sovereign downgrade -28.520 -41.841 -42.132 -42.132 
 [-1.064] [-1.619] [-1.637] [-1.637] 
Bound 16.410* 28.831* 28.671* 28.671* 
 [1.986] [2.041] [2.029] [2.029] 
Sovereign downgrade × Bound 73.833** 106.000*** 106.376*** 106.376*** 
 [2.358] [4.626] [4.655] [4.655] 
Loan amount -1.943 -1.951 -1.966 -1.966 
 [-0.662] [-0.459] [-0.462] [-0.462] 
Maturity 0.302** 0.168 0.17 0.17 
 [2.220] [0.807] [0.818] [0.818] 
Collateral 0.037 13.832 13.785 13.785 
 [0.007] [1.193] [1.192] [1.192] 
Number of lenders 0.259 0.029 0.041 0.041 
 [1.029] [0.107] [0.153] [0.153] 
Performance provisions -14.371 -4.026 -4.261 -4.261 
 [-1.423] [-0.454] [-0.481] [-0.481] 
General covenants 8.21 4.652 4.63 4.63 
 [1.264] [0.729] [0.725] [0.725] 
Bank size -0.953 -3.028 -2.933 -2.933 
 [-0.285] [-0.687] [-0.665] [-0.665] 
Bank ROA -3.322 -5.825 -5.964 -5.964 
 [-1.151] [-1.659] [-1.696] [-1.696] 
Bank NPLs 1.023** 0.282 0.256 0.256 
 [2.678] [0.499] [0.451] [0.451] 
Firm size 1.553 -15.326 -14.938 -14.938 
 [1.230] [-0.726] [-0.708] [-0.708] 
Firm ROA -112.483* -110.699 -100.167 -100.167 
 [-1.908] [-1.392] [-1.281] [-1.281] 
Firm leverage 1.674 3.456* 3.477* 3.477* 
 [1.549] [1.843] [1.855] [1.855] 
GDP growth -1.039 0.574 0.572 0.572 
 [-0.872] [0.433] [0.432] [0.432] 
GDP per capita  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 [-0.964] [-0.439] [-0.391] [-0.391] 
Constant 97.262 301.151 291.403 291.403 
 [1.389] [1.712] [1.647] [1.647] 
Observations 6,201 2,351 2,346 2,346 
Adj. R-squared 0.809 0.849 0.85 0.85 
Loan type effects Y Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y Y 
Borrower’s country effects Y Y Y Y 
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Table 8. Results for AISU 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics [in brackets]. Dependent variable is AISU and all variables are defined in Table A1. 
Estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by firm and year. Each specification includes a different set of fixed 
effects, as given in the lower part of the table. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sovereign downgrade -4.170 -4.170 -4.170 -4.148 -3.483 -2.916 
 [-1.574] [-1.573] [-1.573] [-1.595] [-1.335] [-1.171] 
Bound -1.473 -1.473 -1.473 -1.182 -1.842 -1.790 
 [-0.599] [-0.599] [-0.599] [-0.479] [-0.741] [-0.685] 
Sovereign downgrade × Bound 7.618*** 7.618*** 7.618*** 7.654*** 8.719* 8.822* 
 [3.162] [3.160] [3.160] [2.917] [1.899] [2.053] 
AISD 0.148*** 0.148*** 0.148*** 0.146*** 0.148*** 0.149*** 
 [22.421] [22.407] [22.407] [21.647] [20.593] [20.840] 
Loan amount -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 0.017 0.140 0.145 
 [-0.058] [-0.058] [-0.058] [0.054] [0.491] [0.510] 
Maturity 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.008 0.008 
 [0.879] [0.878] [0.878] [0.823] [0.511] [0.496] 
Collateral 3.341*** 3.341*** 3.341*** 3.352*** 3.515*** 3.529*** 
 [4.034] [4.031] [4.031] [4.084] [4.367] [4.379] 
Number of lenders -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.017 -0.021 -0.022 
 [-0.320] [-0.320] [-0.320] [-0.727] [-0.960] [-1.021] 
Performance provisions -0.924* -0.924* -0.924* -0.765 -0.774 -0.768 
 [-1.730] [-1.729] [-1.729] [-1.463] [-1.483] [-1.467] 
General covenants 0.113 0.113 0.113 0.157 0.100 0.098 
 [0.398] [0.398] [0.398] [0.567] [0.335] [0.333] 
Bank size 0.396 0.396 0.396 0.372   
 [0.831] [0.830] [0.830] [0.791]   
Bank ROA -0.726* -0.726* -0.726* -0.698*   
 [-1.803] [-1.802] [-1.802] [-1.787]   
Bank NPLs 0.092 0.092 0.092 0.098   
 [1.202] [1.201] [1.201] [1.190]   
Firm size -0.351 -0.351 -0.351 -0.305 -0.235 -0.222 
 [-0.922] [-0.922] [-0.922] [-0.825] [-0.589] [-0.551] 
Firm ROA -6.286** -6.286** -6.286** -5.620** -1.264 -1.263 
 [-2.626] [-2.625] [-2.625] [-2.515] [-1.281] [-1.269] 
Firm leverage 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 [0.459] [0.458] [0.458] [0.736] [1.174] [1.050] 
GDP growth -0.157 -0.157 -0.157 -0.233 -0.419  
 [-0.701] [-0.701] [-0.701] [-1.176] [-1.199]  
GDP per capita  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 [0.223] [0.223] [0.223] [0.445] [0.289]  
Constant 4.479 4.479 4.479 3.814 6.156 5.889 
 [0.523] [0.522] [0.522] [0.442] [1.086] [1.059] 
Observations 29,463 29,463 29,463 29,363 35,045 35,090 
Adj. R-squared 0.831 0.831 0.831 0.831 0.840 0.838 
Loan type effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose effects N N N Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y N N N 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y N N 
Bank × year effects N N N N Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Lender’s country effects N N Y Y Y N 
Lender’s country × year effects N N N N N Y 
Borrower’s country effects N Y Y Y Y Y 
Country-pair effects N N N Y Y Y 
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Table 9. Other loan characteristics 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics [in brackets]. The dependent variable is denoted in the second line of the table and 
all variables are defined in Table A1. Estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by firm and year. The lower part 
of the table denotes the type of fixed effects used in each specification. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) 
Loan 
amount 
(2) 
Maturity 
 
(3) 
Collateral 
 
(4) 
Performance 
provisions 
(5) 
Number of 
lenders 
(6) 
Herfindahl 
 
Sovereign downgrade -0.046 0.643 0.012 -0.053 1.475* 42.232 
 [-1.439] [0.338] [0.749] [-1.090] [2.026] [0.391] 
Bound -0.086 3.219 -0.035 -0.043 1.129 -256.844*** 
 [-1.068] [1.385] [-0.755] [-1.110] [0.782] [-2.855] 
Sovereign downgrade × Bound -0.063 -10.462** 0.004 0.154** -4.023*** 369.683* 
 [-0.422] [-2.121] [0.049] [2.640] [-3.479] [1.742] 
AISD -0.001*** 0.003 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.005** 0.175 
 [-6.235] [0.800] [6.164] [-4.369] [-2.750] [0.312] 
Loan amount  1.618*** -0.008* 0.023*** 1.507*** -340.159*** 
  [7.067] [-1.952] [4.573] [9.815] [-6.304] 
Maturity 0.004***  0.001*** 0.000 0.022** -0.666 
 [4.441]  [3.588] [0.871] [2.582] [-0.599] 
Collateral -0.065* 3.007***  0.057*** -0.873* 125.961* 
 [-1.956] [4.672]  [3.271] [-1.856] [1.761] 
Number of lenders 0.017*** 0.097*** -0.001* 0.006***  -38.864*** 
 [9.199] [3.146] [-1.800] [5.624]  [-3.839] 
Performance provisions 0.105*** 0.484 0.033***  2.707*** -219.591*** 
 [4.759] [1.071] [3.356]  [9.734] [-3.783] 
General covenants 0.005 -0.323* 0.068*** 0.151*** 0.800*** -2.046 
 [0.565] [-1.889] [11.985] [22.587] [6.700] [-0.068] 
Bank size 0.005 -0.316 0.004 0.007 -0.701*** 97.459* 
 [0.209] [-0.508] [0.431] [0.497] [-2.852] [1.864] 
Bank ROA 0.001 0.235 -0.003 -0.007 0.320 -36.195 
 [0.072] [0.729] [-0.650] [-0.753] [1.708] [-1.613] 
Bank NPLs -0.007** 0.091 -0.002 0.001 0.040 -4.732 
 [-2.189] [1.142] [-1.522] [0.804] [1.165] [-0.969] 
Firm size 0.162* 0.669 -0.046*** -0.004 0.999*** 47.990*** 
 [2.032] [1.514] [-5.583] [-0.591] [9.253] [3.354] 
Firm ROA 0.016* -0.156 -0.004 -0.011*** 0.080 -112.413*** 
 [1.819] [-0.833] [-0.875] [-3.491] [1.236] [-5.832] 
Firm leverage -0.000 0.002 -0.000 0.000 0.002 0.098 
 [-0.649] [1.207] [-0.339] [0.291] [0.990] [0.058] 
GDP growth 0.009 -0.111 0.001 -0.001 0.264* 20.722** 
 [1.260] [-0.725] [0.603] [-0.202] [1.973] [2.096] 
GDP per capita  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
 [0.745] [0.633] [0.987] [0.789] [0.153] [-0.102] 
Constant 18.100*** 12.814 0.737*** -0.364* -17.376*** 6,886.106*** 
 [20.737] [1.036] [5.213] [-1.913] [-3.185] [5.779] 
Observations 61,985 61,985 61,985 61,985 61,985 19,212 
Adj. R-squared 0.738 0.712 0.734 0.518 0.657 0.584 
Loan type effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Borrower’s country effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
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Table 10. The loan-demand channel 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics [in brackets]. Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table A1. Estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by 
firm and year. Each specification includes a different set of fixed effects, as given in the lower part of the table. In specification (1), we interact Sovereign downgrade × Bound with Firm size, 
i.e., the log of total firm assets. In specification (2), we interact Sovereign downgrade × Bound with Firm ROA, i.e., the return on total firm assets. In specification (3), we interact Sovereign 
downgrade × Bound with Firm EBITDA, i.e., the log of firm EBITDA. In specification (4), we interact Sovereign downgrade × Bound with Firm Income, i.e., the log of firm net income. In 
specification (5), we interact Sovereign downgrade × Bound with Firm leverage, i.e., the firm leverage. In specification (6), we interact Sovereign downgrade × Bound with Firm equity, i.e., 
the log of firm equity capital. In specification (7), we interact Sovereign downgrade × Bound with Firm cash, i.e., the log of firm cash holdings. In specification (8), we interact Sovereign 
downgrade × Bound with Firm retained earnings, i.e., the log of firm retained earnings. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Sovereign downgrade -33.485 -2.411 -0.363 -23.661* -2.365 -11.544 -19.048** -19.502 
 [-1.674] [-0.308] [-0.047] [-1.931] [-0.303] [-0.574] [-2.310] [-0.724] 
Bound -52.150 9.987 8.935 -29.429 9.611 -29.628 16.531 -61.485* 
 [-1.578] [1.593] [1.354] [-0.714] [1.569] [-0.992] [0.640] [-1.814] 
Sovereign downgrade × Bound 181.396*** 52.167** 113.868** 210.517** 45.821** 160.560*** 174.241*** 142.298** 
 [3.273] [2.177] [2.445] [2.479] [2.737] [2.902] [3.052] [2.631] 
Sovereign downgrade × Bound × Firm size -11.064***        
 [-2.926]        
Sovereign downgrade × Bound × Firm ROA  42.226       
 
 [0.291]       
Sovereign downgrade × Bound × Firm EBITDA   -6.554*      
   [-1.739]      
Sovereign downgrade × Bound × Firm Income    -19.176**     
    [-2.194]     
Sovereign downgrade × Bound × Firm leverage     5.304**    
 
    [2.351]    
Sovereign downgrade × Bound × Firm equity      -10.196**   
      [-2.495]   
Sovereign downgrade × Bound × Firm cash       -15.312**  
       [-2.790]  
Sovereign downgrade × Bound × Firm retained earnings        -9.052** 
        [-2.241] 
Observations 61,985 61,985 58,990 47,801 61,985 58,329 58,263 44,259 
Adj. R-squared 0.768 0.767 0.776 0.788 0.767 0.782 0.766 0.797 
Full set of controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan type effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Borrower’s country effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
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Table 11. Borrower’s country fundamentals 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics [in brackets]. Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table A1. 
Estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by firm and year. Each specification includes a different set of fixed effects, 
as given in the lower part of the table. In specification (1), we interact Sovereign downgrade × Bound with Stock market capitalization, 
i.e., the total value of all listed shares in the borrower’s country stock market (% of GDP). In specification (2), we interact Sovereign 
downgrade × Bound with Financial sector credit, i.e., the domestic credit in the borrower’s country provided by the financial sector 
(% of GDP). In specification (3), we interact Sovereign downgrade × Bound with Banking sector credit, i.e., the domestic credit in the 
borrower’s country provided by the banking sector (% of GDP). In specification (4), we interact Sovereign downgrade × Bound with 
Financial/Banking sector credit, i.e., the ratio of Financial sector credit to Banking sector credit. In specification (5), we interact 
Sovereign downgrade × Bound with Exchange rate arrangement, i.e., a categorical variable ranging from 1 to 5 reflecting the exchange 
rate regime in the borrower’s country based on the exchange rate regime classification of Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2019). The *, 
**, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sovereign downgrade -3.244 -2.459 -2.032 16.755 -2.250 
 [-0.437] [-0.314] [-0.259] [1.588] [-0.285] 
Bound 6.996 10.010 8.713 33.699** 8.679 
 [1.151] [1.614] [1.445] [2.546] [1.425] 
Sovereign downgrade × Bound 86.050** 56.397*** 28.145* 17.818 103.768*** 
 [2.526] [3.045] [2.013] [0.528] [2.896] 
Sovereign downgrade × Bound × Stock market capitalization -47.754*     
 [-1.994]     
Sovereign downgrade × Bound × Financial sector credit  -92.763***    
 
 [-4.325]    
Sovereign downgrade × Bound × Banking sector credit   53.283**   
   [2.111]   
Sovereign downgrade × Bound × Financial/Banking sector credit    -65.260*  
    [-2.019]  
Sovereign downgrade × Bound × Exchange rate arrangement     -26.875* 
     [-2.054] 
Observations 59,435 61,985 61,985 15,302 61,806 
Adj. R-squared 0.767 0.767 0.768 0.827 0.768 
Full set of controls Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan type effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Borrower’s country effects Y Y Y Y Y 
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Table 12. Lending relationships and subsidiary role 
This table reports estimated coefficients and t-statistics [in brackets]. Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table A1. Estimation method used is OLS with standard 
errors clustered by firm and year. Each specification includes a different set of fixed effects, as given in the lower part of the table. In specification (1), we interact Sovereign downgrade × 
Bound with Relationship lending, i.e., a binary variable equal to 1 for a prior lending relationship between the lender and the borrower during the previous 2-year period, otherwise zero. In 
specification (2), we interact Sovereign downgrade × Bound with Relationship lending number, i.e., the ratio of the number of prior loans between the lender and the borrower during the 
previous 2-year period to the total number of loans received by the borrower during the same period. In specification (3), we interact Sovereign downgrade × Bound with Relationship lending 
amount, i.e., the ratio of the amount of prior loans between the lender and the borrower during the previous 2-year period to the total amount of loans received by the borrower during the same 
period. In specification (4), we interact Sovereign downgrade × Bound with Bank subsidiary, i.e., a binary variable equal to one if the lender operates a subsidiary in the borrower’s country, 
otherwise zero. In specification (5), we interact Sovereign downgrade × Bound with Firm subsidiary, i.e., a binary variable equal to one if the borrower operates a subsidiary in the lender’s 
country, otherwise zero. In specification (6), we interact Sovereign downgrade × Bound with Government-owned firm, i.e., a binary variable equal to one if the borrower is government-owned, 
otherwise zero. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sovereign downgrade -2.012 -1.057 -1.179 -3.153 -2.432 -2.985 
 [-0.213] [-0.131] [-0.146] [-0.399] [-0.303] [-0.386] 
Bound 3.020 8.287 8.005 10.398 10.239 11.266* 
 [0.513] [1.364] [1.337] [1.603] [1.619] [1.771] 
Sovereign downgrade × Bound 67.107*** 57.751*** 58.075*** 55.488*** 56.287*** 57.495*** 
 [3.108] [3.039] [3.063] [2.985] [3.087] [3.035] 
Sovereign downgrade × Bound × Relationship lending -27.634**      
 [-2.518]      
Sovereign downgrade × Bound × Relationship lending number  -67.392*     
 
 [-1.722]     
Sovereign downgrade × Bound × Relationship lending amount   -70.809*    
 
  [-1.786]    
Sovereign downgrade × Bound × Bank subsidiary    -35.507***   
    [-5.080]   
Sovereign downgrade × Bound × Firm subsidiary     -22.249  
     [-1.635]  
Sovereign downgrade × Bound × Government-owned firm      -143.129** 
      [-2.573] 
Observations 61,985 61,985 61,867 61,985 61,985 61,985 
Adj. R-squared 0.768 0.768 0.767 0.767 0.767 0.768 
Full set of controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan type effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Borrower’s country effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
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Internet Appendix 
Syndicated bank lending and rating downgrades:  
Do sovereign ceiling policies really matter? 
 
 
Abstract 
The first section includes the definitions of variables employed. The second section includes 
information on the construction of the sample. The third section reports several additional 
sensitivity tests. 
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Table A1. Variable definitions and sources 
Variable  Description Source 
   
A. Dependent variables in main specifications 
AISD All-in-spread-drawn, defined as the sum of the spread over LIBOR plus any facility 
fee. 
DealScan 
AISU  All-in-spread-undrawn, defined as the sum of the facility fee and the commitment 
fee. 
DealScan 
 
B. Main explanatory variables: Sovereign downgrade 
Sovereign downgrade A binary variable equal to one, if the sovereign’s long-term foreign-currency credit 
rating is downgraded in the year before the loan facility’s origination year, 
otherwise zero. Sovereign downgrade lc is the equivalent variable for local-
currency credit ratings. 
S&P 
Credit Ratings 
Short-term downgrade  A binary variable equal to one, if the sovereign’s short-term foreign-currency credit 
rating is downgraded in the year before the loan facility’s origination year, 
otherwise zero. 
S&P 
Credit Ratings 
Outlook downgrade  A binary variable equal to one, if the outlook on the sovereign’s long-term foreign-
currency credit rating is downgraded in the year before the loan facility’s 
origination year, otherwise zero. 
S&P 
Credit Ratings 
 
C. Main explanatory variables: Bounded firms 
Bound A binary variable equal to one if the borrower’s credit rating is equal to or above 
the borrower’s country credit rating in the year before the loan facility’s origination 
year, otherwise zero. The variable Bound (Bank) is the equivalent variable for the 
lender’s credit rating, and the variable Bound (Bank & Firm) is the equivalent 
variable for the lender’s and the borrower’s credit ratings. 
S&P 
Credit Ratings 
   
D. Explanatory variables: Loan characteristics 
Loan amount Log of the loan facility amount in USD. DealScan 
Maturity  Loan duration in months. DealScan 
Collateral A binary variable equal to one if the loan is secured with collateral, zero otherwise. DealScan 
Number of lenders The number of banks involved in the syndicated loan. DealScan 
Performance provisions A binary variable equal to one if the loan has performance pricing provisions, zero 
otherwise. 
DealScan 
General covenants The total number of covenants in the loan contract. DealScan 
Financial covenants The number of financial covenants in the loan contract. DealScan 
Net covenants The number of net covenants in the loan contract. DealScan 
Loan type A series of binary variables indicating loan type (e.g., term loans, revolvers, etc.). DealScan 
Loan purpose A series of binary variables indicating loan purpose (e.g., corporate purpose, debt 
repay, etc.). 
DealScan 
Bank share The bank’s share of the loan facility. DealScan 
Herfindahl The Herfindahl index of the syndicate (a measure of the concentration of holdings 
within a syndicate). The Herfindahl index is calculated using each syndicate 
member’s share in the loan. It is the sum of the squared individual shares in the 
loan, and varies from zero to 10,000, with 10,000 being the Herfindahl when a 
lender holds 100% of the loan. 
DealScan 
Relationship lending A binary variable equal to one for a prior loan facility between the lender and the 
borrower in the 2-year period before the loan facility’s origination year, zero 
otherwise. 
DealScan 
 
Relationship lending number The ratio of the number of prior loan facilities between the lender and the borrower 
in the 2-year period before the loan facility’s origination year to the total number 
of loans received by the borrower during the same period. 
DealScan 
 
Relationship lending amount The ratio of the amount of prior loan facilities between the lender and the borrower 
in the 2-year period before the loan facility’s origination year to the total amount 
of loans received by the borrower during the same period.  
DealScan 
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E. Explanatory variables: Lender characteristics  
Bank size The log of total bank assets. Compustat 
Bank ROA The return on total bank assets. Compustat 
Bank NPLs The ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. Compustat 
Lerner index The Lerner index of the bank, which equals (p-mc/p), where p is the average 
lending rate given by each bank in each year and mc is the marginal cost of 
producing bank output (also at the bank-year). We proxy the lending rate from the 
ratio of interest income to total commercial loans and we estimate the marginal 
cost from the non-parametric estimation of a cost function. We provide more 
details at the end of this Appendix. 
Compustat and 
own estimations 
Bank subsidiary Abinary variable equal to one if the lender operates a subsidiary in the borrower’s 
country, otherwise zero. 
DealScan 
 
F. Explanatory variables: Borrower characteristics 
Firm size The log of total firm assets. Compustat 
Firm ROA The return on total firm assets. Compustat 
Firm EBITDA The log of firm EBITDA Compustat 
Firm income The log of firm net income Compustat 
Firm leverage The firm leverage. Compustat 
Firm equity The log of firm equity capital. Compustat 
Firm cash The log of firm cash holdings. Compustat 
Firm retained earnings The log of firm retained earnings. Compustat 
Firm subsidiary A binary variable equal to one if the borrower operates a subsidiary in the lender’s 
country, otherwise zero. 
DealScan 
G. Explanatory variables: Borrower’s country characteristics 
 
GDP growth The difference in annual GDP growth rate (%) between the lender’s and the 
borrower’s countries. 
WDI 
 
GDP per capita The difference in annual GDP per capita in constant prices between the lender’s 
and the borrower’s countries. 
WDI 
 
Stock market capitalization The total value (in USD) of all listed shares in the borrower’s country stock market 
as a percentage of GDP. 
WDI 
Financial sector credit The domestic credit in the borrower’s country provided by the financial sector as 
a percentage of GDP. 
WDI 
Banking sector credit The domestic credit in the borrower’s country provided by the banking sector as a 
percentage of GDP. 
WDI 
Exchange rate arrangement A categorical variable ranging from 1 to 5 reflecting the exchange rate arrangement 
in the borrower’s country. The variable is based on the exchange rate regime 
classification of  Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2019), with lower values reflecting 
less flexible arrangements (e.g., a value of 1 includes pre announced pegs, currency 
board arrangements, pre announced horizontal bands narrower than or equal to +/-
2%, de facto pegs) and higher values reflecting more flexible arrangements (e.g., a 
value of 4 includes freely floating arrangements, and a value of 5 includes freely 
floating arrangements). 
Ilzetzki, Reinhart, 
and Rogoff (2019) 
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Table A2. Sovereign downgrades and bounded firms affected 
The table presents the sovereign downgrade events for the borrower countries in our sample and the bounded firms affected. 
 Country Year of Downgrade Bounded firms affected 
 Mexico 1995 AXA SA de CV 
 Turkey 1996 Turk Ekonomi Bankasi AS [TEB] 
 Korea (South) 1997 Hana Bank 
 Malaysia 1997 Tenaga Nasional Bhd 
 Malaysia 1997 Telekom Malaysia Bhd 
 Hong Kong 1998 Citibank NA Hong Kong Branch 
 Hong Kong 1998 Bank of America Asia 
 Malaysia 1998 Public Bank Bhd 
 Malaysia 1998 Malayan Banking Bhd 
 Argentina 2000 Transportadora de Gas del Sur SA 
 Turkey 2001 Turkiye Garanti Bankasi AS 
 Turkey 2001 Finansbank AS [Turkey] 
 Japan 2002 Tokyo Electric Power Co Inc 
 Japan 2002 Ajinomoto Co Inc 
 Japan 2002 Abbott Japan Co Ltd 
 Philippines 2003 Globe Telecom Inc 
 Greece 2004 Coca-Cola Hellenic Bottling Co SA (CCHBC) 
 Philippines 2005 San Miguel Corp 
 Italy 2006 Enel SpA 
 Argentina 2008 Pan American Energy 
 Russia 2008 Severneftegazprom OAO 
 Russia 2008 Sakhalin II Project 
 Mexico 2009 PMI Trading Ltd 
 Mexico 2009 Grupo Bimbo 
 Mexico 2009 Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex) 
 Greece 2010 OTE Hellenic Telecommunications Organisation SA 
 Ireland 2010 Accenture 
 Portugal 2010 Energias de Portugal SA [EDP] 
 Greece 2011 Titan Cement Co SA 
 Greece 2011 Coca-Cola Hellenic Bottling Co SA (CCHBC) 
 Italy 2011 SNAM Rete Gas SpA 
 USA 2011 Momentive Performance Materials Inc 
 USA 2011 WW Grainger Inc 
 USA 2011 NetJets Inc 
 Italy 2012 SNAM Rete Gas SpA 
 Italy 2012 Enel Rete Gas SpA 
 Portugal 2012 Energias de Portugal SA [EDP] 
 Spain 2012 Gas Natural SDG SA 
 Spain 2012 Amadeus IT Group SA 
 Spain 2012 Iberdrola SA 
 Spain 2012 Enagas SA 
 Argentina 2013 Pan American Energy 
 Italy 2013 Enel SpA 
 Italy 2013 Luxottica Group SpA 
 Italy 2013 Terna SpA [Trasmissione Elettricita Rete Nazionale] 
 Ukraine 2013 Ferrexpo Group 
 Argentina 2014 Pan American Energy 
 Brazil 2014 Vale SA 
 Brazil 2014 Gerdau 
 Ghana 2014 Kosmos Energy Ghana HC 
 Italy 2014 Enel SpA 
 Italy 2014 Exor SpA 
 Italy 2014 Terna SpA [Trasmissione Elettricita Rete Nazionale] 
 Russia 2014 Uralkali JSC [Uralkaly OAO] 
 Russia 2014 Gazprom OAO 
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 South Africa 2014 Investec Bank Ltd [South Africa] 
 Bahrain 2015 Bahrain Steel B.S.C.C. EC 
 Russia 2015 Uralkali JSC [Uralkaly OAO] 
 Mexico 1995 AXA SA de CV 
 Turkey 1996 Turk Ekonomi Bankasi AS [TEB] 
 Korea (South) 1997 Hana Bank 
 Malaysia 1997 Tenaga Nasional Bhd 
 Malaysia 1997 Telekom Malaysia Bhd 
 Hong Kong 1998 Citibank NA Hong Kong Branch 
 Hong Kong 1998 Bank of America Asia 
 Malaysia 1998 Public Bank Bhd 
 Malaysia 1998 Malayan Banking Bhd 
 Argentina 2000 Transportadora de Gas del Sur SA 
 Turkey 2001 Turkiye Garanti Bankasi AS 
 Turkey 2001 Finansbank AS [Turkey] 
 Japan 2002 Tokyo Electric Power Co Inc 
 Japan 2002 Ajinomoto Co Inc 
 Japan 2002 Abbott Japan Co Ltd 
 Philippines 2003 Globe Telecom Inc 
 Greece 2004 Coca-Cola Hellenic Bottling Co SA (CCHBC) 
 Philippines 2005 San Miguel Corp 
 Italy 2006 Enel SpA 
 Argentina 2008 Pan American Energy 
 Russia 2008 Severneftegazprom OAO 
 Russia 2008 Sakhalin II Project 
 Mexico 2009 PMI Trading Ltd 
 Mexico 2009 Grupo Bimbo 
 Mexico 2009 Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex) 
 Greece 2010 OTE Hellenic Telecommunications Organisation SA 
 Ireland 2010 Accenture 
 Portugal 2010 Energias de Portugal SA [EDP] 
 Greece 2011 Titan Cement Co SA 
 Greece 2011 Coca-Cola Hellenic Bottling Co SA (CCHBC) 
 Italy 2011 SNAM Rete Gas SpA 
 USA 2011 Momentive Performance Materials Inc 
 USA 2011 WW Grainger Inc 
 USA 2011 NetJets Inc 
 Italy 2012 SNAM Rete Gas SpA 
 Italy 2012 Enel Rete Gas SpA 
 Portugal 2012 Energias de Portugal SA [EDP] 
 Spain 2012 Gas Natural SDG SA 
 Spain 2012 Amadeus IT Group SA 
 Spain 2012 Iberdrola SA 
 Spain 2012 Enagas SA 
 Argentina 2013 Pan American Energy 
 Italy 2013 Enel SpA 
 Italy 2013 Luxottica Group SpA 
 Italy 2013 Terna SpA [Trasmissione Elettricita Rete Nazionale] 
 Ukraine 2013 Ferrexpo Group 
 Argentina 2014 Pan American Energy 
 Brazil 2014 Vale SA 
 Brazil 2014 Gerdau 
 Ghana 2014 Kosmos Energy Ghana HC 
 Italy 2014 Enel SpA 
 Italy 2014 Exor SpA 
 Italy 2014 Terna SpA [Trasmissione Elettricita Rete Nazionale] 
 Russia 2014 Uralkali JSC [Uralkaly OAO] 
 Russia 2014 Gazprom OAO 
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 South Africa 2014 Investec Bank Ltd [South Africa] 
 Bahrain 2015 Bahrain Steel B.S.C.C. EC 
 Russia 2015 Uralkali JSC [Uralkaly OAO] 
Total 20 19 49 
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Table A3. Different loan controls 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics [in brackets]. Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined 
in Table A1. Estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by firm and year. Different specifications 
include different loan controls to show that the estimates on the term Sovereign downgrade × Bound are not overly 
sensitive to the loan controls used. The lower part of the table denotes the type of fixed effects used in each 
specification. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sovereign downgrade -2.032 -2.249 -2.800 -1.751 
 
[-0.235] [-0.286] [-0.351] [-0.213] 
Bound 10.010 10.932 8.492 10.617 
 
[1.635] [1.680] [1.464] [1.677] 
Sovereign downgrade × Bound 56.986*** 54.809*** 57.707*** 52.915*** 
 [2.969] [2.862] [3.198] [2.812] 
Loan amount   -8.070*** -7.273*** 
 
  [-6.855] [-5.965] 
Maturity   0.095 0.068 
 
  [1.048] [0.742] 
Collateral  31.714***  32.712*** 
 
 [5.718]  [5.745] 
Number of lenders  -0.556***  -0.510*** 
 
 [-4.663]  [-4.054] 
Performance provisions  -15.995*** -15.418***  
 
 [-4.705] [-4.802]  
General covenants  4.329*** 6.380***  
 
 [3.178] [4.197]  
Bank size 1.380 0.545 0.664 0.253 
 [0.519] [0.209] [0.252] [0.101] 
Bank ROA -6.299* -5.791* -6.088* -5.725* 
 [-2.062] [-2.008] [-2.033] [-1.910] 
Bank NPLs 0.452 0.531 0.413 0.485 
 [1.321] [1.615] [1.225] [1.509] 
Firm size -4.854 -2.329 -3.080 -0.995 
 [-1.382] [-0.753] [-1.082] [-0.372] 
Firm ROA -3.760 -3.631 -3.562 -3.190 
 [-0.961] [-1.006] [-0.954] [-0.896] 
Firm leverage 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.013 
 [0.710] [0.947] [0.872] [1.024] 
GDP growth -0.941 -0.725 -0.714 -0.626 
 [-1.202] [-0.892] [-0.929] [-0.786] 
GDP per capita  -0.002* -0.002* -0.002 -0.002* 
 [-1.824] [-1.936] [-1.687] [-1.877] 
Constant 194.378*** 179.878*** 343.689*** 310.498*** 
 [4.193] [4.125] [7.578] [7.597] 
Observations 62,888 62,888 61,985 61,985 
Adj. R-squared 0.756 0.762 0.763 0.766 
Loan type effects Y Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y Y 
Borrower’s country effects Y Y Y Y 
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Table A4. Different clustering of standard errors 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics [in brackets]. Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table 1. 
Estimation method is OLS. The lower part of the table denotes the type of fixed effects used in each specification and the type of 
standard error clustering (C refers to borrower’s country, F refers to firm, L refers to loan, and Y refers to year). The *, **, and 
*** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sovereign downgrade -2.426 -2.426 -2.426 -2.426 -2.426 
 
[-0.324] [-0.386] [-0.369] [-0.448] [-0.369] 
Bound 10.032* 10.032 10.032*** 10.032*** 10.032*** 
 
[1.981] [1.501] [3.741] [2.800] [3.741] 
Sovereign downgrade × Bound 54.627*** 54.627*** 54.627*** 54.627*** 54.627*** 
 [3.245] [2.808] [3.312] [2.986] [3.312] 
Loan amount -6.935*** -6.935*** -6.935*** -6.935*** -6.935*** 
 [-6.896] [-7.231] [-7.433] [-9.490] [-7.433] 
Maturity 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.073 
 [0.824] [1.160] [0.666] [0.782] [0.666] 
Collateral 32.060*** 32.060*** 32.060*** 32.060*** 32.060*** 
 [6.123] [8.975] [5.266] [6.244] [5.266] 
Number of lenders -0.440*** -0.440*** -0.440** -0.440*** -0.440** 
 [-3.996] [-3.868] [-2.733] [-4.284] [-2.733] 
Performance provisions -14.914*** -14.914*** -14.914*** -14.914*** -14.914*** 
 [-4.745] [-7.451] [-4.088] [-4.348] [-4.088] 
General covenants 4.434*** 4.434*** 4.434*** 4.434*** 4.434*** 
 [3.515] [4.109] [3.989] [8.944] [3.989] 
Bank size 0.193 0.193 0.193 0.193 0.193 
 [0.085] [0.087] [0.080] [0.089] [0.080] 
Bank ROA -5.712* -5.712*** -5.712*** -5.712*** -5.712*** 
 [-2.000] [-2.797] [-3.015] [-4.328] [-3.015] 
Bank NPLs 0.489 0.489* 0.489 0.489* 0.489 
 [1.584] [1.811] [1.310] [1.814] [1.310] 
Firm size -1.045 -1.045 -1.045 -1.045 -1.045 
 [-0.513] [-0.414] [-0.296] [-0.297] [-0.296] 
Firm ROA -3.336 -3.336 -3.336 -3.336 -3.336 
 [-1.311] [-0.949] [-0.758] [-0.752] [-0.758] 
Firm leverage 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013*** 0.013 
 [1.091] [1.191] [1.218] [10.306] [1.218] 
GDP growth -0.612 -0.612 -0.612 -0.612 -0.612 
 [-0.982] [-0.840] [-0.683] [-0.679] [-0.683] 
GDP per capita  -0.002** -0.002** -0.002 -0.002* -0.002 
 [-2.346] [-2.303] [-1.205] [-1.793] [-1.205] 
Constant 305.260*** 305.260*** 305.260*** 305.260*** 305.260*** 
 [8.555] [7.716] [6.398] [6.174] [6.398] 
Observations 61,985 61,985 61,985 61,985 61,985 
Adj. R-squared 0.768 0.767 0.767 0.767 0.767 
Loan type effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Borrower’s country effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Clustering L&Y L&F C&Y C&F C&F&Y 
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Table A5. Weighted least squares 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics [in brackets]. Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table A1. 
Estimation method is weighted least squares with standard errors clustered by firm and year. The lower part of the table denotes 
the type of fixed effects used in each specification. In specification (1), we weight by the number of loans between the lender’s 
country and the borrower’s country to the total number of loans in our sample. In specification (2), we employ the weight of 
specification (1) at the yearly frequency. In specification (3), we weight by the number of loans between the lender and the 
borrower’s country to the total number of loans in our sample. In specification (4), we employ the weight of specification (3) at 
the yearly frequency. In specification (5), we weight by the number of loans between the lender and the borrower to the total 
number of loans in our sample. In specification (6), we employ the weight of specification (5) at the yearly frequency. The *, **, 
and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sovereign downgrade -2.423 -1.939 -2.457 -2.399 -2.425 -2.180 
 
[-0.309] [-0.249] [-0.314] [-0.308] [-0.310] [-0.275] 
Bound 10.027 10.190 10.002 10.033 10.023 9.814 
 
[1.614] [1.644] [1.609] [1.616] [1.615] [1.589] 
Sovereign downgrade × Bound 54.659*** 53.977*** 54.669*** 54.509*** 54.609*** 54.888*** 
 [2.973] [2.953] [2.979] [2.976] [2.968] [2.950] 
Loan amount -6.929*** -6.852*** -6.927*** -6.899*** -6.939*** -6.708*** 
 [-6.015] [-5.984] [-6.007] [-5.994] [-6.029] [-5.899] 
Maturity 0.073 0.070 0.073 0.072 0.073 0.070 
 [0.789] [0.753] [0.789] [0.784] [0.794] [0.764] 
Collateral 32.059*** 31.998*** 32.039*** 31.958*** 32.069*** 31.598*** 
 [5.733] [5.721] [5.732] [5.711] [5.744] [5.743] 
Number of lenders -0.440*** -0.442*** -0.441*** -0.440*** -0.440*** -0.451*** 
 [-3.494] [-3.495] [-3.496] [-3.496] [-3.495] [-3.547] 
Performance provisions -14.921*** -15.090*** -14.941*** -14.952*** -14.916*** -14.905*** 
 [-4.581] [-4.584] [-4.584] [-4.572] [-4.583] [-4.565] 
General covenants 4.434*** 4.475*** 4.418*** 4.436*** 4.438*** 4.358*** 
 [3.212] [3.224] [3.207] [3.212] [3.211] [3.171] 
Bank size 0.152 -0.227 0.182 0.327 0.190 -0.099 
 [0.060] [-0.092] [0.072] [0.131] [0.075] [-0.039] 
Bank ROA -5.798* -6.009** -5.811* -5.907* -5.726* -5.562* 
 [-1.982] [-2.076] [-1.995] [-1.988] [-1.960] [-1.873] 
Bank NPLs 0.470 0.299 0.464 0.490 0.488 0.506 
 [1.450] [1.002] [1.440] [1.535] [1.510] [1.563] 
Firm size -1.062 -1.220 -1.057 -1.098 -1.043 -1.208 
 [-0.407] [-0.476] [-0.404] [-0.420] [-0.400] [-0.447] 
Firm ROA -3.328 -3.293 -3.363 -3.366 -3.336 -3.323 
 [-0.949] [-0.945] [-0.959] [-0.961] [-0.951] [-0.953] 
Firm leverage 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.012 
 [1.040] [1.050] [1.038] [1.058] [1.035] [1.018] 
GDP growth -0.620 -0.637 -0.621 -0.602 -0.614 -0.608 
 [-0.776] [-0.805] [-0.778] [-0.759] [-0.769] [-0.755] 
GDP per capita  -0.002* -0.002** -0.002* -0.002** -0.002* -0.002* 
 [-2.037] [-2.090] [-2.065] [-2.100] [-2.036] [-2.020] 
Observations 61,985 61,985 61,985 61,985 61,985 61,985 
Adj. R-squared 0.767 0.768 0.767 0.768 0.767 0.768 
Loan type effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Borrower’s country effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
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Table A6. Heckman sample-selection model 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics [in brackets] from Heckman’s (1979) sample-selection model. The dependent 
variable is in the second line of each panel and all variables are defined in Table A1. Estimation method in Panel A is 
maximum likelihood and in Panel B is OLS with standard errors clustered by firm and year. Panel A reports the estimates 
from the first-stage probit model to estimate the determinants of the firm’s loan-taking decision. The lower part panel A 
denotes the dummy variables used in each specification. Panel B reports the estimates from the second-stage OLS 
regression for the effect of firm credit rating changes on loan spreads. Each of the specification in Panel B includes the 
inverse mills ratio (Lambda) from the corresponding specification in Panel A. The lower part of Panel B denotes the type 
of fixed effects used in each specification. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively. 
Panel A: The loan-taking decision by the firm 
 
 
(1) 
Loan deal 
(2) 
Loan deal 
(3) 
Loan deal 
Firm size 0.085*** 0.120*** 0.119*** 
 
[49.258] [25.908] [25.183] 
Firm ROA 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 
 
[5.908] [5.800] [5.802] 
Firm leverage 0.000** 0.000 0.000* 
 
[2.198] [1.264] [1.917] 
Firm equity  -0.038*** -0.037*** 
 
 [-7.936] [-7.485] 
Firm debt   -0.003 
 
 
 [-1.434] 
Loan amount 0.223*** 0.228*** 0.228*** 
 
[77.890] [76.729] [76.719] 
Maturity -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000** 
 
[-3.380] [-2.394] [-2.404] 
Collateral 0.297*** 0.269*** 0.270*** 
 
[35.439] [30.554] [30.582] 
Number of lenders 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 
 
[37.270] [35.823] [35.815] 
Performance provisions 0.378*** 0.417*** 0.417*** 
 
[38.547] [41.074] [41.069] 
General covenants 0.014*** 0.006 0.006 
 
[3.963] [1.545] [1.533] 
Bank size 0.006* 0.002 0.002 
 
[1.655] [0.460] [0.467] 
Bank ROA 0.015** 0.013** 0.013** 
 
[2.473] [2.060] [2.079] 
Bank NPLs -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.025*** 
 
[-14.250] [-13.931] [-13.939] 
Bank loans 4.864*** 5.157*** 5.158*** 
 
[20.971] [21.370] [21.372] 
Firm loans -70.395*** -41.605*** -41.429*** 
 
[-12.306] [-6.516] [-6.492] 
Bank-firm loans  -197.504*** -197.361*** 
 
 [-7.003] [-7.000] 
Constant -72.722*** -69.223*** -69.167*** 
 
[-44.846] [-40.412] [-40.371] 
Observations 169,172 161,483 161,483 
Loan type effects dummies Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y 
Bank dummies Y Y Y 
Firm dummies Y Y Y 
Borrower’s country dummies Y Y Y 
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Panel B: The effect of Sovereign downgrade × Bound on loan spreads 
 
 
(1) 
AISD 
(2) 
AISD 
(3) 
AISD 
Sovereign -2.221 -0.325 -0.313 
 
[-0.282] [-0.039] [-0.038] 
Bound 10.758 8.036 8.074 
 
[1.699] [1.276] [1.280] 
Sovereign downgrade × Bound 53.769*** 56.107*** 56.058*** 
 
[2.892] [2.924] [2.920] 
Loan amount -2.558 -5.912** -5.665** 
 
[-1.138] [-2.738] [-2.638] 
Maturity 0.066 0.120 0.119 
 
[0.714] [1.350] [1.346] 
Collateral 37.355*** 30.673*** 30.936*** 
 
[5.590] [4.866] [4.904] 
Number of lenders -0.206 -0.318** -0.305* 
 
[-1.225] [-2.098] [-2.022] 
Performance provisions -8.279** -9.102** -8.702** 
 
[-2.224] [-2.598] [-2.495] 
General covenants 4.828*** 4.575*** 4.588*** 
 
[3.326] [3.562] [3.574] 
Bank size 0.549 1.008 1.021 
 
[0.218] [0.404] [0.409] 
Bank ROA -5.364* -4.179** -4.159** 
 
[-1.795] [-2.294] [-2.283] 
Bank NPLs -0.003 0.455 0.428 
 
[-0.008] [1.169] [1.102] 
Firm size 0.167 0.777 0.840 
 
[0.061] [0.454] [0.491] 
Firm ROA -2.781 -2.288 -2.259 
 
[-0.807] [-0.883] [-0.871] 
Firm leverage 0.015 0.038** 0.038** 
 
[1.256] [2.238] [2.273] 
GDP growth -0.596 -0.575 -0.574 
 
[-0.748] [-0.720] [-0.719] 
GDP per capita -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* 
 
[-1.850] [-1.980] [-1.981] 
Constant 169.400** 239.782*** 232.312*** 
 
[2.261] [3.638] [3.535] 
Observations 61,985 58,329 58,329 
Year dummies Y Y Y 
Bank dummies Y Y Y 
Firm dummies Y Y Y 
Borrower’s country dummies Y Y Y 
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Table A7. Different macro-controls 
This table reports coefficients and t-statistics [in brackets]. Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table A1. 
The estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by firm and year. Each specification includes a different set of 
macro-level controls. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sovereign downgrade -18.433 -19.591* 0.912 -4.884 -2.323 -18.433 
 
[-1.634] [-1.975] [0.103] [-0.632] [-0.294] [-1.634] 
Bound 10.394 13.418 6.357 14.053 10.305 10.394 
 
[0.929] [1.073] [0.760] [1.526] [1.653] [0.929] 
Sovereign downgrade × Bound 49.757*** 49.677*** 57.141*** 53.395*** 54.211*** 49.757*** 
 [2.959] [3.458] [3.208] [2.837] [2.890] [2.959] 
Loan amount -6.869*** -7.582*** -7.015*** -6.580*** -6.928*** -6.869*** 
 [-6.699] [-6.719] [-5.698] [-6.198] [-6.020] [-6.699] 
Maturity -0.039 -0.114 0.049 0.04 0.074 -0.039 
 [-0.447] [-0.926] [0.520] [0.467] [0.805] [-0.447] 
Collateral 28.934*** 31.660*** 34.548*** 35.395*** 32.116*** 28.934*** 
 [4.467] [4.837] [6.521] [6.542] [5.805] [4.467] 
Number of lenders -0.404** -0.457*** -0.432*** -0.516*** -0.428*** -0.404** 
 [-2.677] [-3.164] [-3.985] [-3.911] [-3.344] [-2.677] 
Performance provisions -18.765*** -20.025*** -16.873*** -15.060*** -15.061*** -18.765*** 
 [-4.325] [-4.393] [-5.089] [-4.610] [-4.577] [-4.325] 
General covenants 4.661** 5.004** 4.688*** 4.155*** 4.421*** 4.661** 
 [2.390] [2.437] [3.337] [3.065] [3.221] [2.390] 
Bank size -1.407 -1.388 -0.599 1.418 0.258 -1.407 
 [-0.486] [-0.357] [-0.227] [0.602] [0.102] [-0.486] 
Bank ROA -5.577* -4.687 -6.622** -4.903* -5.684* -5.577* 
 [-1.944] [-1.404] [-2.259] [-1.833] [-1.975] [-1.944] 
Bank NPLs 0.301 -0.074 0.628* 0.501 0.478 0.301 
 [0.719] [-0.162] [1.966] [1.570] [1.421] [0.719] 
Firm size -2.077 -1.633 -1.301 -6.651** -1.091 -2.077 
 [-1.630] [-0.929] [-0.564] [-2.556] [-0.418] [-1.630] 
Firm ROA -255.882*** -245.635*** -2.633 -2.984 -3.247 -255.882*** 
 [-7.852] [-7.696] [-0.902] [-0.885] [-0.929] [-7.852] 
Firm leverage -0.071*** -0.071*** 0.013 0.013 0.013 -0.071*** 
 [-5.195] [-5.451] [0.999] [1.034] [1.055] [-5.195] 
GDP growth 0.595 -0.022 -0.808 -1.516** -0.561 0.595 
 [0.564] [-0.020] [-0.886] [-2.507] [-0.692] [0.564] 
GDP per capita  -0.002 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002* -0.002 
 [-1.121] [-0.059] [-1.607] [-1.509] [-2.030] [-1.121] 
Debt-to-GDP 0.932** 1.064***    0.932** 
 
[2.838] [3.055]    [2.838] 
Inflation 0.815     0.815 
 
[1.120]     [1.120] 
Trade balance  -0.000***     
  [-3.906]     
Polity   -3.049    
   [-1.443]    
Economic freedom   -1.874    
   [-1.599]    
Real rate    -0.811   
    [-1.371]   
Vix     0.587  
     [1.533]  
Constant 297.977*** 304.566*** 491.050*** 341.670*** 293.225*** 297.977*** 
 [6.526] [4.904] [4.639] [8.967] [6.973] [6.526] 
Observations 34,961 28,491 55,275 59,118 61,985 34,961 
Adj. R-squared 0.79 0.788 0.772 0.767 0.768 0.79 
Loan type effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
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Year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Borrower’s country effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
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Table A8. Results for AISU (local-currency ratings) 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics [in brackets]. Dependent variable is AISU and all variables are defined in Table A1. 
Estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by firm and year. Each specification includes a different set of fixed 
effects, as given in the lower part of the table. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sovereign downgrade lc -4.059 -4.059 -4.059 -4.254 -3.358 -2.836 
 [-1.557] [-1.556] [-1.556] [-1.659] [-1.321] [-1.165] 
Bound -1.600 -1.600 -1.600 -1.257 -1.807 -1.762 
 [-0.639] [-0.639] [-0.639] [-0.505] [-0.714] [-0.664] 
Sovereign downgrade lc × Bound 8.524*** 8.524*** 8.524*** 8.302*** 9.050** 9.096** 
 [2.988] [2.986] [2.986] [3.046] [2.121] [2.275] 
AISD 0.147*** 0.147*** 0.147*** 0.146*** 0.149*** 0.149*** 
 [22.329] [22.314] [22.314] [21.662] [20.435] [20.692] 
Loan amount -0.025 -0.025 -0.025 0.012 0.140 0.146 
 [-0.077] [-0.077] [-0.077] [0.041] [0.487] [0.508] 
Maturity 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.015 0.008 0.008 
 [0.913] [0.912] [0.912] [0.860] [0.493] [0.476] 
Collateral 3.383*** 3.383*** 3.383*** 3.405*** 3.517*** 3.532*** 
 [4.019] [4.017] [4.017] [4.094] [4.300] [4.314] 
Number of lenders -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.016 -0.021 -0.022 
 [-0.265] [-0.265] [-0.265] [-0.655] [-0.936] [-0.995] 
Performance provisions -0.925 -0.925 -0.925 -0.761 -0.762 -0.754 
 [-1.704] [-1.703] [-1.703] [-1.445] [-1.452] [-1.432] 
General covenants 0.105 0.105 0.105 0.149 0.097 0.095 
 [0.368] [0.368] [0.368] [0.532] [0.323] [0.319] 
Bank size 0.369 0.369 0.369 0.337   
 [0.776] [0.776] [0.776] [0.717]   
Bank ROA -0.721* -0.721* -0.721* -0.691*   
 [-1.811] [-1.810] [-1.810] [-1.780]   
Bank NPLs 0.095 0.095 0.095 0.100   
 [1.222] [1.221] [1.221] [1.198]   
Firm size -0.321 -0.321 -0.321 -0.275 -0.193 -0.180 
 [-0.836] [-0.835] [-0.835] [-0.731] [-0.480] [-0.444] 
Firm ROA -6.488** -6.488** -6.488** -5.827** -1.268 -1.267 
 [-2.668] [-2.667] [-2.667] [-2.562] [-1.273] [-1.261] 
Firm leverage 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 
 [0.418] [0.417] [0.417] [0.695] [1.256] [1.130] 
GDP growth -0.159 -0.159 -0.159 -0.242 -0.418  
 [-0.727] [-0.727] [-0.727] [-1.291] [-1.201]  
GDP per capita  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 [0.237] [0.237] [0.237] [0.467] [0.314]  
Constant 4.616 4.616 4.616 4.050 5.691 5.425 
 [0.532] [0.532] [0.532] [0.465] [1.002] [0.973] 
Observations 29,353 29,353 29,353 29,253 34,742 34,787 
Adj. R-squared 0.831 0.831 0.831 0.832 0.840 0.838 
Loan type effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose effects N N N Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y N N N 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y N N 
Bank × year effects N N N N Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Lender’s country effects N N Y Y Y N 
Lender’s country × year effects N N N N N Y 
Borrower’s country effects N Y Y Y Y Y 
Country-pair effects N N N Y Y Y 
 
